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On the manipulability of voting rules: The case of 4 and 5 alternatives

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  • Aleskerov, Fuad
  • Karabekyan, Daniel
  • Sanver, M. Remzi
  • Yakuba, Vyacheslav

Abstract

By extending manipulability indices defined for single-valued social choice rules to the multi-valued case, we explore the degree of manipulability of seven multi-valued social choice rules. Our analysis is based on computational experiments.

Suggested Citation

  • Aleskerov, Fuad & Karabekyan, Daniel & Sanver, M. Remzi & Yakuba, Vyacheslav, 2012. "On the manipulability of voting rules: The case of 4 and 5 alternatives," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 67-73.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:64:y:2012:i:1:p:67-73
    DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.10.001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    7. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lirong Xia, 2022. "The Impact of a Coalition: Assessing the Likelihood of Voter Influence in Large Elections," Papers 2202.06411, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2023.
    2. Salvador Barberà & Danilo Coelho, 2024. "Mechanisms to Appoint Arbitrator Panels or Sets of Judges by Compromise Between Concerned Parties," Working Papers 1442, Barcelona School of Economics.
    3. Diss, Mostapha & Tsvelikhovskiy, Boris, 2021. "Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 11-18.
    4. Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa, 2020. "Simulations in Models of Preference Aggregation," Post-Print hal-02424936, HAL.
    5. Alexander Karpov, 2020. "The likelihood of single-peaked preferences under classic and new probability distribution assumptions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 55(4), pages 629-644, December.
    6. Gori, Michele, 2021. "Manipulation of social choice functions under incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 350-369.
    7. Bednay, Dezső & Moskalenko, Anna & Tasnádi, Attila, 2019. "Dictatorship versus manipulability," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 72-76.
    8. Yuliya A. Veselova, 2020. "Does Incomplete Information Reduce Manipulability?," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 523-548, June.
    9. Jansen, C. & Schollmeyer, G. & Augustin, T., 2018. "A probabilistic evaluation framework for preference aggregation reflecting group homogeneity," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 49-62.
    10. Daniel Karabekyan, 2016. "Strategic Behavior in Exhaustive Ballot Voting: What Can We Learn from the FIFA World Cup 2018 and 2022 Host Elections?," HSE Working papers WP BRP 130/EC/2016, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    11. Aleksei Y. Kondratev & Alexander S. Nesterov, 2020. "Measuring majority power and veto power of voting rules," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 183(1), pages 187-210, April.
    12. Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa, 2019. "Simulations in Models of Preference Aggregation," Working Papers hal-02424936, HAL.
    13. Yuliya A. Veselova, 2016. "Does Incomplete Information Reduce Manipulability?," HSE Working papers WP BRP 152/EC/2016, National Research University Higher School of Economics.

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