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International Conventions and Non-State Actors: Selection, Signaling, and Reputation Effects

Author

Listed:
  • Kristian Skrede Gleditsch

    (Department of Government, University of Essex, UK)

  • Simon Hug

    (Universit� de G�neve)

  • Livia Isabella Schubiger

    (University of Zurich)

  • Julian Wucherpfennig

    (University of Zurich)

Abstract

Non-state actors (NSAs) play an important role in violent conflicts, but unlike state actors they cannot (be forced to) sign international conventions tying their hands. The nongovernmental organization Geneva Call has stepped into this void and solicits NSAs to sign and allow monitoring of conventions banning particular activities, for example the use of landmines. We propose a game-theoretic model to assess the motivations for NSAs (and states) to sign such conventions and how they affect conflict behavior on the ground. We find that selection issues are of crucial importance linked to the incentive to signal resolve, both by states and NSAs. Empirical analyses of conflict behavior in countries where Geneva Call has been active support the implications of the theoretical model.

Suggested Citation

  • Kristian Skrede Gleditsch & Simon Hug & Livia Isabella Schubiger & Julian Wucherpfennig, 2011. "International Conventions and Non-State Actors: Selection, Signaling, and Reputation Effects," HiCN Working Papers 108, Households in Conflict Network.
    • Handle: RePEc:hic:wpaper:108
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    References listed on IDEAS

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