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The Power of Money: Wealth Effects in Contests

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Abstract

Two wealth effects typically arise in any contest: i) wealth decreases the marginal cost of effort, but also ii) decreases the marginal benefit of winning the contest. In this paper, we introduce three types of strategic contest models depending on whether the first, second, or both wealth effects play a role: namely, a privilege contest, an ability contest, and a rent-seeking contest. Our theoretical analysis reveals that the effects of wealth and wealth inequality are strongly “contestdependent” and are complex in the sense that they depend on the decisiveness of the contest and on the higher-order derivatives of the utility functions of wealth. Our analysis thus does not support general claims that the rich should lobby more or that low economic growth and wealth inequality should lead to additional conflicts.

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  • Schroyen, Fred & Treich, Nicolas, 2013. "The Power of Money: Wealth Effects in Contests," Discussion Paper Series in Economics 13/2013, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:nhheco:2013_013
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    Cited by:

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    2. Fu, Qiang & Wang, Xiruo & Wu, Zenan, 2021. "Multi-prize contests with risk-averse players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 513-535.
    3. Kyung Hwan Baik & Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Abhijit Ramalingam, 2020. "The effects of conflict budget on the intensity of conflict: an experimental investigation," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 23(1), pages 240-258, March.
    4. Fu, Qiang & Lyu, Youji & Wu, Zenan & Zhang, Yuanjie, 2022. "Expectations-based loss aversion in contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 1-27.
    5. Dickson, Alex & MacKenzie, Ian A. & Sekeris, Petros G., 2018. "Rent-seeking incentives in share contests," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 53-62.
    6. Chung, Keunsuk & Lee, Dongryul, 2017. "Inefficient competition in shadow-education investment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 152-165.
    7. Alex Dickson & Ian A. MacKenzie & Petros G. Sekeris, 2022. "Rent Dissipation in Simple Tullock Contests," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(6), pages 1-11, December.
    8. Liqun Liu & Nicolas Treich, 2021. "Optimality of winner-take-all contests: the role of attitudes toward risk," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 63(1), pages 1-25, August.
    9. Kyung Hwan Baik & Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Abhijit Ramalingam, 2014. "Resources for Conflict: Constraint or Wealth?," University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series 061, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    10. Liqun Liu & Jack Meyer & Andrew J. Rettenmaier & Thomas R. Saving, 2018. "Risk and risk aversion effects in contests with contingent payments," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 56(3), pages 289-305, June.
    11. Brookins, Philip & Jindapon, Paan, 2021. "Risk preference heterogeneity in group contests," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(C).
    12. Mario Menegatti, 2021. "Risk aversion in two-period rent-seeking games," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 188(1), pages 269-287, July.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Conflict; contest; rent-seeking; wealth; risk aversion; lobbying; power; redistribution.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

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