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Enforcement of Exogenous Environmental Regulations, Social Disapproval, and Bribery

Author

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  • Akpalu, Wisdom

    (Department of History, Economics and Politics, State University of New York at Farmingdale)

  • Eggert, Håkan

    (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University)

  • Vondolia, Godwin K.

    (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University)

Abstract

Many resource users are not directly involved in the formulation and enforcement of resource management rules and regulations in developing countries. As a result, resource users do not generally accept such rules. Enforcement officers who have social ties to the resource users may encounter social disapproval and possible social exclusion from the resource users if they enforce regulations zealously. The officers, however, may avoid this social disapproval by accepting bribes. In this paper, we present a simple model that characterizes this situation and derives results for situations where officers are passively and actively involved in the bribery.

Suggested Citation

  • Akpalu, Wisdom & Eggert, Håkan & Vondolia, Godwin K., 2009. "Enforcement of Exogenous Environmental Regulations, Social Disapproval, and Bribery," Working Papers in Economics 392, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0392
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Natural resource management; bribery; law enforcement; social exclusion;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

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