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Traffic Routing Oligopoly

Author

Listed:
  • David Csercsik

    (P zm ny P‚ter Catholic University Faculty of Information Technology)

  • Balazs Sziklai

    (Institute of Economics Research Centre for Economic and Regional Studies Hungarian Academy of Sciences)

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to introduce a novel family of games related to congested networks. Traffic routing has been extensively analyzed from the non-cooperative aspect. A common assumption is that each individual optimizes his route in the network selfishly. However looking at the same network from a different scope in some cases we can find some actors that are responsible for the majority part of the traffic. From the point of view of these actors cooperation is indeed an inherent possibility of the game. Sharing information and cooperation with other agents may result in cost savings, and more efficient utilization of network capacities. Depending on the goal and employed strategy of the agents many possible cooperative games can arise. Our aim is to introduce and analyze these wide variety of transferable utility (TU) games. Since the formation of a coalition may affect other players costs via the implied flow and the resulting edge load changes in the network, externalities may arise, thus the underlying games are given in partition function form.

Suggested Citation

  • David Csercsik & Balazs Sziklai, 2013. "Traffic Routing Oligopoly," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 1309, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
    • Handle: RePEc:has:discpr:1309
    as

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    File URL: http://econ.core.hu/file/download/mtdp/MTDP1309.pdf
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    Other versions of this item:

    • Dávid Csercsik & Balázs Sziklai, 2015. "Traffic routing oligopoly," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 23(4), pages 743-762, December.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Grabisch, Michel & Funaki, Yukihiko, 2012. "A coalition formation value for games in partition function form," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 221(1), pages 175-185.
    2. Kóczy, László Á., 2009. "Sequential coalition formation and the core in the presence of externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 559-565, May.
    3. László Kóczy, 2007. "A recursive core for partition function form games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 63(1), pages 41-51, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. László Á. Kóczy, 2018. "Partition Function Form Games," Theory and Decision Library C, Springer, number 978-3-319-69841-0, December.
    2. Ferenc Forgó & László Kóczy & Miklós Pintér, 2015. "Editorial," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 23(4), pages 723-725, December.
    3. D'avid Csercsik & Anne Neumann, 2022. "Solidarity in natural gas storage: A potential allocation mechanism of stored quantities among several players during times of crisis," Papers 2209.05089, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2023.
    4. Dávid Csercsik & Sándor Imre, 2017. "Cooperation and coalitional stability in decentralized wireless networks," Telecommunication Systems: Modelling, Analysis, Design and Management, Springer, vol. 64(4), pages 571-584, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cooperative game theory; Partition function form games; Routing; Externalities;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L91 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Transportation: General

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