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Shapley value for TU-games with multiple memberships and externalities

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  • Sokolov, Denis

Abstract

In this paper, we introduce a new form, the clique function form (CQFF), of TU-games that allows for multiple memberships and explicit externalities. The new notion is based on a graphical representation of the connections between agents in a game. We treat as coalitions only fully connected sub-graphs (i.e., maximal cliques). Following Myerson (1977a) we adapt the well-known efficiency, symmetry, and linearity axioms to the new setting and obtain a unique value for superadditive CQFF games.

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  • Sokolov, Denis, 2022. "Shapley value for TU-games with multiple memberships and externalities," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 76-90.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:119:y:2022:i:c:p:76-90
    DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2022.06.005
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