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Stationary Consistent Equilibrium Coalition Structures Constitute the Recursive Core

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  • Laszlo A. Koczy

    (Institute of Economics Research Centre for Economic and Regional Studies Hungarian Academy of Sciences)

Abstract

We study coalitional games where the coalitional payoffs depend on the entire coalition structure. We introduce a noncooperative, sequential coalition formation model and show that the set of equilibrium outcomes coincides with the recursive core, a generalisation of the core to such games. In order to extend past results limited to totally recursive-balanced partition function form games we introduce subgame-consistency that requires perfectness in relevant subgames only, while some unreached subgames are ignored. Due to the externalities, the profitability of deviations depends on the partition formed by the remaining players: the stability of core payoff configurations is ensured by a combination of the pessimism of players going for certain profits only and the assumption that players base their stationary strategies on a made-up history punishing some of the possible deviators - and getting this sometimes right.

Suggested Citation

  • Laszlo A. Koczy, 2012. "Stationary Consistent Equilibrium Coalition Structures Constitute the Recursive Core," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 1226, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
    • Handle: RePEc:has:discpr:1226
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Maria Montero, 2023. "Coalition Formation in Games with Externalities," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 525-548, June.
    2. László Á. Kóczy, 2018. "Partition Function Form Games," Theory and Decision Library C, Springer, number 978-3-319-69841-0, September.
    3. Greg Leo & Yevgeniy Vorobeychik & Myrna Wooders, 2023. "Subgame Perfect Coalition Formation," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 510-524, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    partition function; externalities; implementation; recursive core; stationary perfect equilibrium; time consistent equilibrium;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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