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Efficiency and Stability in Electrical Power Transmission Networks: a Partition Function Form Approach

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  • Dávid Csercsik

    (Pázmány Péter Catholic University)

  • László Á. Kóczy

    (Center for Economic and Regional Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences
    Óbuda University)

Abstract

The users of electricity networks are organized into groups where the production and consumption of electricity is in balance. We study the formation of these balancing groups using a cooperative game in partition function form defined over an ideal (lossless) DC load flow model of the power grid. We show that such games contain widespread externalities that can be both negative and positive. We study the stability of certain partitions using the concept of the recursive core. While the game is clearly cohesive, we demonstrate that it is not necessarily superadditive. We argue that subadditivity may be a barrier to achieve full cooperation.

Suggested Citation

  • Dávid Csercsik & László Á. Kóczy, 2017. "Efficiency and Stability in Electrical Power Transmission Networks: a Partition Function Form Approach," Networks and Spatial Economics, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 1161-1184, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:netspa:v:17:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s11067-017-9363-0
    DOI: 10.1007/s11067-017-9363-0
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Saavedra–Nieves, Alejandro & Casas–Méndez, Balbina, 2023. "On the centrality analysis of covert networks using games with externalities," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 309(3), pages 1365-1378.
    3. László Á. Kóczy, 2022. "Core-stability over networks with widespread externalities," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 318(2), pages 1001-1027, November.
    4. Basso, Franco & Basso, Leonardo J. & Rönnqvist, Mikael & Weintraub, Andres, 2021. "Coalition formation in collaborative production and transportation with competing firms," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 289(2), pages 569-581.

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