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Cost allocation in partition function form games

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  • Lech Kruś

Abstract

A cooperative game in partition function form is proposed for a cost allocation problem. The game describes a real situation in which a payoff of any coalition does not only depend on the players in the coalition but also on the coalition structure of the other players. Solution concepts like the stable set and the core are analyzed. Relations of the concepts in the case of the game in partition function form and of an appropriately formulated game in characteristic function form are shown.

Suggested Citation

  • Lech Kruś, 2009. "Cost allocation in partition function form games," Operations Research and Decisions, Wroclaw University of Science and Technology, Faculty of Management, vol. 19(2), pages 39-49.
    • Handle: RePEc:wut:journl:v:2:y:2009:p:39-49
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    References listed on IDEAS

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