IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/rnp/ecopol/ep1440.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Incentives for cooperative-specific investments from court decisions to the theoretical analysis
[Стимулы Для Осуществления Кооперативных Специфических Инвестиций: От Судебных Решений К Теоретическому Анализу]

Author

Listed:
  • Agamirova, Maria (Агамирова, Мария)

    (National Research University Higher School of Economics)

  • Dzagurova, Natalia (Дзагурова, Наталия)

    (National Research University Higher School of Economics)

Abstract

It is believed that theoretical research have a significant impact on the norms of antimonopoly regulation and enforcement practices. However, detailed analysis shows that these ideas do not correspond to the actual sequence of events. In this paper we focus on a relatively narrow area, in which the role of theoretical analysis recognizes extremely important - namely, in the antitrust regulation limiting vertical agreements (BOC). Comparative analysis of the time change regulations BOC and the emergence of theoretical concepts, which are now widely used to justify the need for such changes suggests that the development of the theory not only led to a change in regulatory regimes BOC, but, rather, is itself based on the discussions related antitrust proceedings .

Suggested Citation

  • Agamirova, Maria (Агамирова, Мария) & Dzagurova, Natalia (Дзагурова, Наталия), 2014. "Incentives for cooperative-specific investments from court decisions to the theoretical analysis [Стимулы Для Осуществления Кооперативных Специфических Инвестиций: От Судебных Решений К Теоретическ," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 4, pages 79-97.
    • Handle: RePEc:rnp:ecopol:ep1440
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://repec.ranepa.ru/rnp/ecopol/ep1440.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. La Porta, Rafael & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1997. "Legal Determinants of External Finance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(3), pages 1131-1150, July.
    2. Howard P. Marvel & Stephen McCafferty, 1984. "Resale Price Maintenance and Quality Certification," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(3), pages 346-359, Autumn.
    3. R. H. Coase, 1972. "Industrial Organization: A Proposal for Research," NBER Chapters, in: Economic Research: Retrospect and Prospect, Volume 3, Policy Issues and Research Opportunities in Industrial Organization, pages 59-73, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1998. "Law and Finance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(6), pages 1113-1155, December.
    5. Rey, Patrick & Tirole, Jean, 1986. "The Logic of Vertical Restraints," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(5), pages 921-939, December.
    6. Nicola Giocoli, 2009. "Competition Versus Property Rights: American Antitrust Law, The Freiburg School, And The Early Years Of European Competition Policy," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(4), pages 747-786.
    7. Hart, Oliver, 1995. "Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198288817.
    8. MacLeod, W Bentley & Malcomson, James M, 1993. "Investments, Holdup, and the Form of Market Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 811-837, September.
    9. Giocoli, Nicola, 2008. "Competition vs. property rights: American antitrust law, the Freiburg School and the early years of European competition policy," MPRA Paper 33807, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Marvel, Howard P, 1982. "Exclusive Dealing," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(1), pages 1-25, April.
    11. Nataliya Dzagurova & Svetlana Avdasheva, 2010. "Current Theoretical Approaches to the Analysis of Exclusive Agreements and Legislative Norms of their Regulation," Public administration issues, Higher School of Economics, issue 1, pages 69-88.
    12. Comanor, William S & Frech, H E, III, 1985. "The Competitive Effects of Vertical Agreements?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(3), pages 539-546, June.
    13. Patrick Rey & Joseph Stiglitz, 1995. "The Role of Exclusive Territories in Producers' Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(3), pages 431-451, Autumn.
    14. Donald B. Hausch & Yeon-Koo Che, 1999. "Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 125-147, March.
    15. Joseph J. Spengler, 1950. "Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(4), pages 347-347.
    16. Frank Mathewson & Ralph Winter, 1998. "The Law and Economics of Resale Price Maintenance," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 13(1), pages 57-84, April.
    17. Mathewson, G Frank & Winter, Ralph A, 1987. "The Competitive Effects of Vertical Agreements: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 1057-1062, December.
    18. Kovacic, William E, 1992. "The Influence of Economics on Antitrust Law," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 30(2), pages 294-306, April.
    19. Brian Cheffins, 2004. "Mergers and the Evolution of Patterns of Corporate Ownership and Control: The British Experience," Business History, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 46(2), pages 256-284.
    20. B. Cheffins, 2001. "History and the Global Corporate Governance Revolution: The UK Perspective," Business History, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 43(4), pages 87-118.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Agamirova, Maria Е. (Агамирова, Мария) & Dzagurova, Nataliya B. (Дзагурова, Наталия), 2016. "The Legality of Vertical Restraints by the Rule of Reason and the Character of the Specific Investments [Правомерность Вертикальных Ограничивающих Соглашений С Позиции "Взвешенного Подхода&quo," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 6, pages 122-137, December.
    2. Svetlana V. Orekhova & Ivan A. Butakov, 2022. "Relation-specific investment: Theoretical axioms vs Evidence from Russia," Upravlenets, Ural State University of Economics, vol. 13(6), pages 30-43, January.
    3. Дзагурова Наталия Борисовна & Невидомская Мария Александровна, 2015. "«Запаздывание» Специфических Инвестиций Как Временной Аналог Недоинвестирования," Journal of Institutional Studies Journal of Institutional Studies (Журнал институциональных исследований), CyberLeninka;Общество с ограниченной ответственностью «Гуманитарные перспективы», vol. 7(3), pages 76-91.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Oana Secrieru, 2006. "The Economic Theory Of Vertical Restraints," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(5), pages 797-822, December.
    2. Kitamura, Hiroshi & Matsushima, Noriaki & Sato, Misato, 2018. "Exclusive contracts with complementary inputs," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 145-167.
    3. Ralph A. Winter, 2009. "Presidential Address: Antitrust restrictions on single-firm strategies," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 42(4), pages 1207-1239, November.
    4. Committee, Nobel Prize, 2016. "Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström: Contract Theory," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2016-1, Nobel Prize Committee.
    5. Дзагурова Наталия Борисовна, 2016. "Направления Повышения Привлекательности Лотерей, Сопряженных С Осуществлением Кооперативных Специфических Инвестиций," Journal of Institutional Studies Journal of Institutional Studies (Журнал институциональных исследований), CyberLeninka;Общество с ограниченной ответственностью «Гуманитарные перспективы», vol. 8(4), pages 53-71.
    6. Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "Vertikale Unternehmenskooperationen," MPRA Paper 6930, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. repec:bla:jecsur:v:12:y:1998:i:4:p:333-59 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Ilya Segal & Michael D.Whinston, 2012. "Property Rights [The Handbook of Organizational Economics]," Introductory Chapters,, Princeton University Press.
    9. Bakó, Barna & Kálecz-Simon, András, 2012. "Vertikális korlátozások - növelik vagy csökkentik a jólétet?. Érvek az irodalomból [Vertical constraints - do they increase or reduce welfare?. Arguments in the literature]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(10), pages 1138-1159.
    10. Eduard Marinov, 2016. "The 2016 Nobel Prize in Economics," Economic Thought journal, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute, issue 6, pages 97-149.
    11. Sass, Tim R., 2005. "The competitive effects of exclusive dealing: Evidence from the U.S. beer industry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(3-4), pages 203-225, April.
    12. Spiegel, Yossi & Yehezkel, Yaron, 2003. "Price and non-price restraints when retailers are vertically differentiated," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(7), pages 923-947, September.
    13. Adongo, Jonathan O., 2017. "Legal jurisdiction, director liability law, and venture capitalists’ equity stakes in Africa," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 78-93.
    14. Anderson, Anne & Gupta, Parveen P., 2009. "A cross-country comparison of corporate governance and firm performance: Do financial structure and the legal system matter?," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 61-79.
    15. Djankov, Simeon & La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei, 2008. "The law and economics of self-dealing," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3), pages 430-465, June.
    16. Alessandra Bonfiglioli, 2004. "Equities and Inequality," 2004 Meeting Papers 256, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    17. Agamirova, Maria Е. (Агамирова, Мария) & Dzagurova, Nataliya B. (Дзагурова, Наталия), 2016. "The Legality of Vertical Restraints by the Rule of Reason and the Character of the Specific Investments [Правомерность Вертикальных Ограничивающих Соглашений С Позиции "Взвешенного Подхода&quo," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 6, pages 122-137, December.
    18. Buchen, Clemens, 2010. "Emerging economic systems in Central and Eastern Europe – a qualitative and quantitative assessment," EconStor Theses, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, number 37141, September.
    19. Paolo G. Garella & Martin Peitz, 2000. "Intermediation Can Replace Certification," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(1), pages 1-24, March.
    20. David Spector, 2011. "Exclusive contracts and demand foreclosure," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 42(4), pages 619-638, December.
    21. Josef Windsperger, 2003. "Complementarities and Substitutabilities in Franchise Contracting: Some Results from the German Franchise Sector," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 7(3), pages 291-313, September.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rnp:ecopol:ep1440. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: RANEPA maintainer (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/aneeeru.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.