Dynamic equilibrium in games with randomly arriving players
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- Pierre Bernhard & Marc Deschamps, 2016. "Dynamic equilibrium in games with randomly arriving players," Working Papers hal-01394813, HAL.
- Pierre Bernhard & Marc Deschamps, 2016. "Dynamic equilibrium in games with randomly arriving players," Working Papers 2016-10, CRESE.
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"Dynamic equilibrium in games with randomly arriving players,"
Working Papers
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Cited by:
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- Pierre Bernhard & Marc Deschamps, 2016.
"Dynamic equilibrium in games with randomly arriving players,"
Working Papers
2016-10, CRESE.
- Pierre Bernhard & Marc Deschamps, 2016. "Dynamic equilibrium in games with randomly arriving players," Working Papers hal-01379644, HAL.
- Pierre Bernhard & Marc Deschamps, 2016. "Dynamic equilibrium in games with randomly arriving players," Working Papers hal-01394813, HAL.
- Pierre Bernhard & Marc Deschamps, 2016.
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- Pierre Bernhard & Marc Deschamps, 2016. "Cournot oligopoly with randomly arriving producers," Working Papers hal-01413910, HAL.
- Pierre Bernhard & Marc Deschamps, 2020.
"Le Modèle de Cournot avec entrées aléatoires de firmes,"
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hal-03547666, HAL.
- Pierre Bernhard & Marc Deschamps, 2020. "Le Modèle de Cournot avec entrées aléatoires de firmes," Post-Print hal-03547666, HAL.
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More about this item
Keywords
Nash equilibrium; Dynamic programming; Isaacs equation; Piecewise deterministic Markov decision processes;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-GTH-2016-11-27 (Game Theory)
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