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Dynamic equilibrium in games with randomly arriving players

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  • Pierre Bernhard

    (BIOCORE - Biological control of artificial ecosystems - LOV - Laboratoire d'océanographie de Villefranche - OOVM - Observatoire océanologique de Villefranche-sur-mer - UPMC - Université Pierre et Marie Curie - Paris 6 - INSU - CNRS - Institut national des sciences de l'Univers - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UPMC - Université Pierre et Marie Curie - Paris 6 - INSU - CNRS - Institut national des sciences de l'Univers - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - CRISAM - Inria Sophia Antipolis - Méditerranée - Inria - Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique)

  • Marc Deschamps

    (BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE])

Abstract

This note follows our previous works on games with randomly arriving players [3] and [5]. Contrary to these two articles, here we seek a dynamic equilibrium, using the tools of piecewise deterministic control systems The resulting discrete Isaacs equation obtained is rather involved. As usual, it yields an explicit algorithm in the finite horizon, linear-quadratic case via a kind of discrete Riccati equation. The infinite horizon problem is briefly considered. It seems to be manageable only if one limits the number of players present in the game. In that case, the linear quadratic problem seems solvable via essentially the same algorithm, although we have no convergence proof, but only very convincing numerical evidence. We extend the solution to more general entry processes, and more importantly , to cases where the players may leave the game, investigating several stochastic exit mechanisms. We then consider the continuous time case, with a Poisson arrival process. While the general Isaacs equation is as involved as in the discrete time case, the linear quadratic case is simpler, and, provided again that we bound the maximum number of players allowed in the game, it yields an explicit algorithm with a convergence proof to the solution of the infinite horizon case, subject to a condition reminiscent of that found in [20]. As in the discrete time case, we examine the case where players may leave the game, investigating several possible stochastic exit mechanisms. MSC: 91A25, 91A06, 91A20, 91A23, 91A50, 91A60, 49N10, 93E03. Foreword This report is a version of the article [2] where players minimize instead of maximizing, and the linear-quadratic examples are somewhat different.

Suggested Citation

  • Pierre Bernhard & Marc Deschamps, 2016. "Dynamic equilibrium in games with randomly arriving players," Working Papers hal-01379644, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01379644
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://inria.hal.science/hal-01379644
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    9. Pierre Bernhard & Marc Deschamps, 2017. "On Dynamic Games with Randomly Arriving Players," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 360-385, September.
    10. Kaplan, Todd R. & Zamir, Shmuel, 2015. "Advances in Auctions," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    11. Pierre Bernhard & Marc Deschamps, 2016. "Dynamic equilibrium in games with randomly arriving players," Working Papers 2016-10, CRESE.
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    Cited by:

    1. Pierre Bernhard & Marc Deschamps, 2021. "Dynamic Equilibrium with Randomly Arriving Players," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 242-269, June.
    2. Pierre Bernhard & Marc Deschamps, 2016. "Dynamic equilibrium in games with randomly arriving players," Working Papers 2016-10, CRESE.
    3. Pierre Bernhard & Marc Deschamps, 2016. "Cournot oligopoly with randomly arriving producers," Working Papers 2016-14, CRESE.
    4. Pierre Bernhard & Marc Deschamps, 2020. "Le Modèle de Cournot avec entrées aléatoires de firmes," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03547666, HAL.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Nash equilibrium; Dynamic programming; Isaacs equation; Piecewise deterministic Markov decision processes;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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