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On Dynamic Games with Randomly Arriving Players

Author

Listed:
  • Pierre Bernhard

    (INRIA-Sophia Antipolis Méditerranée)

  • Marc Deschamps

    (Université de Bourgogne Franche-Comté)

Abstract

We consider a dynamic game where additional players (assumed identical, even if there will be a mild departure from that hypothesis) join the game randomly according to a Bernoulli process. The problem solved here is that of computing their expected payoff as a function of time and the number of players present when they arrive, if the strategies are given. We consider both a finite horizon game and an infinite horizon, discounted game. As illustrations, we discuss some examples relating to oligopoly theory (Cournot, Stackelberg, cartel).

Suggested Citation

  • Pierre Bernhard & Marc Deschamps, 2017. "On Dynamic Games with Randomly Arriving Players," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 360-385, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:dyngam:v:7:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s13235-016-0197-z
    DOI: 10.1007/s13235-016-0197-z
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Francesco Sinopoli & Christopher Künstler & Claudia Meroni & Carlos Pimienta, 2023. "Poisson–Cournot games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 75(3), pages 803-840, April.
      • Francesco De Sinopoli & Christopher Kunstler & Claudia Meroni & Carlos Pimienta, 2020. "Poisson-Cournot Games," Discussion Papers 2020-07, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
    2. Romain Biard & Marc Deschamps & Mostapha Diss & Alexis Roussel, 2024. "Assessing Available Care Time and Nursing Shortage in a Hospital," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 26(02), pages 1-26, June.
    3. Pierre Bernhard & Marc Deschamps, 2020. "Le Modèle de Cournot avec entrées aléatoires de firmes," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03547666, HAL.
    4. Pierre Bernhard & Marc Deschamps, 2016. "Dynamic equilibrium in games with randomly arriving players," Working Papers 2016-10, CRESE.
    5. Nikolaos Chrysanthopoulos & George P. Papavassilopoulos, 2021. "Adaptive rules for discrete-time Cournot games of high competition level markets," Operational Research, Springer, vol. 21(4), pages 2879-2906, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bernoulli process of entry; Market structure; Dynamic programming;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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