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Le Modèle de Cournot avec entrées aléatoires de firmes

Author

Listed:
  • Pierre Bernhard

    (BIOCORE - Biological control of artificial ecosystems - CRISAM - Inria Sophia Antipolis - Méditerranée - Inria - Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique - LOV - Laboratoire d'océanographie de Villefranche - INSU - CNRS - Institut national des sciences de l'Univers - SU - Sorbonne Université - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - IMEV - Institut de la Mer de Villefranche - SU - Sorbonne Université - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

  • Marc Deschamps

    (CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE], BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - AgroParisTech - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) Mulhouse - Colmar - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po)

Abstract

Le nom de Cournot est aujourd'hui mondialement connu et, à l'instar de celui de Walras, il n'est aucune personne qui se soit un tant soit peu intéressée à la discipline économique qui ne l'ait, à un titre ou à un autre, aperçu au moins une fois. Ses apports majeurs concernent au moins : 1/ la fonction de demande, 2/ l'élasticité, 3/ le coût marginal, 4/ le monopole, 5/ l'oligopole, et 6/ la concurrence. De plus, même si la réception de son œuvre économique ne fut pas simple, rapide et directe, comme le démontre notamment Sigot, 2005, il est actuellement presque unanimement considéré, a minima, comme l'un des pères fondateurs de l'application de la méthode mathématique à l'analyse économique, de l'analyse en termes d'équilibre partiel et d'équilibre général, du paradigme néo-classique, ainsi qu'un précurseur du concept d'équilibrenon-coopératif de Nash

Suggested Citation

  • Pierre Bernhard & Marc Deschamps, 2020. "Le Modèle de Cournot avec entrées aléatoires de firmes," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03547666, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-03547666
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://inria.hal.science/hal-03547666v1
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. James W. Friedman, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 38(1), pages 1-12.
    2. Francesco Sinopoli & Christopher Künstler & Claudia Meroni & Carlos Pimienta, 2023. "Poisson–Cournot games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 75(3), pages 803-840, April.
      • Francesco De Sinopoli & Christopher Kunstler & Claudia Meroni & Carlos Pimienta, 2020. "Poisson-Cournot Games," Discussion Papers 2020-07, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
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    4. Pierre Bernhard & Marc Deschamps, 2017. "On Dynamic Games with Randomly Arriving Players," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 360-385, September.
    5. Pierre Bernhard & Marc Deschamps, 2016. "Dynamic equilibrium in games with randomly arriving players," Working Papers 2016-10, CRESE.
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