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The Wage of Temporary Agency Workers

Author

Listed:
  • Antonin Bergeaud

    (HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales, CEP - LSE - Centre for Economic Performance - LSE - London School of Economics and Political Science, CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research)

  • Pierre Cahuc

    (ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, IZA - Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit - Institute of Labor Economics, CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research)

  • Clément Malgouyres

    (CREST - Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique - ENSAI - Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Analyse de l'Information [Bruz] - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - ENSAE Paris - École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Administration Économique - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, IPP - Institut des politiques publiques)

  • Sara Signorelli

    (CREST - Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique - ENSAI - Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Analyse de l'Information [Bruz] - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris - ENSAE Paris - École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Administration Économique - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris, IZA - Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit - Institute of Labor Economics)

  • Thomas Zuber

    (Centre de recherche de la Banque de France - Banque de France)

  • Isaiah Andrews
  • Stéphane Bonhomme
  • Philippe Choné
  • Simon Jäger
  • Moritz Kuhn
  • Pat Kline
  • Thomas Le Barbanchon
  • Fabien Postel-Vinay
  • Roland Rathelot

Abstract

Using French administrative data we estimate the wage gap distribution between in-house and temporary agency workers working in the same establishment and the same occupation. The average wage gap is about 3% in favor of in-house workers, but the gap is negative in more than 25% of establishment × occupation cells. We develop and estimate a search and matching model which shows that while the wage gap is largely inefficient, eliminating it reduces efficiency, as it also arises from objective factors that contribute to the efficient allocation of jobs.

Suggested Citation

  • Antonin Bergeaud & Pierre Cahuc & Clément Malgouyres & Sara Signorelli & Thomas Zuber & Isaiah Andrews & Stéphane Bonhomme & Philippe Choné & Simon Jäger & Moritz Kuhn & Pat Kline & Thomas Le Barbanch, 2024. "The Wage of Temporary Agency Workers," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-04673773, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-04673773
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-04673773
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. A. Kerem Co?ar & Nezih Guner & James Tybout, 2016. "Firm Dynamics, Job Turnover, and Wage Distributions in an Open Economy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(3), pages 625-663, March.
    2. Christopher A. Pissarides & Barbara Petrongolo, 2001. "Looking into the Black Box: A Survey of the Matching Function," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(2), pages 390-431, June.
    3. John M. Abowd & Francis Kramarz & David N. Margolis, 1999. "High Wage Workers and High Wage Firms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(2), pages 251-334, March.
    4. Acemoglu, Daron & Shimer, Robert, 1999. "Holdups and Efficiency with Search Frictions," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 40(4), pages 827-849, November.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Wage gap; Temporary work agency; Labour market frictions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings

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