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Elections as Incentives: Project Completion and Visibility in African Politics

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  • Benjamin Marx

    (ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

This paper explores the disciplining effect of elections on politicians in Sub-Saharan Africa. Using subnational electoral data from 61 African national elections, I first show that the completion of development projects funded by the World Bank and implemented by governments between 1995 and 2014 yields large electoral benefits for incumbent politicians. The causal effect of completion is identified from an instrumental variables strategy that exploits exogenous variation in the workload of project team leaders at the World Bank. Incumbents are rewarded for completing projects in visible sectors, namely projects providing basic infrastructure and social services, but not for completing projects in other sectors. Using a second instrument that predicts the timing of elections based on predetermined constitutional rules, I then show that governments expedite completion in response to electoral incentives, target their effort towards visible projects, and prioritize completing ongoing projects over initiating new projects before elections. These effects are not driven by intertemporal substitution of government effort across the electoral cycle. Finally, I provide evidence that democratic institutions reduce delays for visible projects on aggregate. Even in Africa's hybrid regimes, elections incentivize politicians to deliver tangible policy outputs.

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  • Benjamin Marx, 2018. "Elections as Incentives: Project Completion and Visibility in African Politics," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03873801, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-03873801
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-03873801
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    1. Ann-Sofie Isaksson & Dick Durevall, 2023. "Aid and institutions: Local effects of World Bank aid on perceived institutional quality in Africa," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 523-551, July.
    2. Cheeseman, Nic & Swedlund, Haley J. & O'Brien-Udry, Cleo, 2024. "Foreign aid withdrawals and suspensions: Why, when and are they effective?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 178(C).

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