IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/pubeco/v239y2024ics0047272724001646.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Paving the road to re-election

Author

Listed:
  • Boudot-Reddy, Camille
  • Butler, André

Abstract

The prevailing view in the economic literature is that voters are particularly myopic, encouraging governments to leverage short-term re-election strategies. Under such conditions, public capital investment with long-term rewards – despite its central role in the process of sustained economic development – may be neglected. In the context of India’s rural road construction programme, this study evaluates the role which large-scale public infrastructure initiatives have on the electoral accountability mechanism. Using a fuzzy regression discontinuity design with newly-digitised village-level voting outcomes from the 2014 general election, the results provide evidence of electoral support attributed to the political alliance which spearheaded the programme. This support is sustained over two electoral cycles, with significant spillover effects in villages within 2 km of a newly built road.

Suggested Citation

  • Boudot-Reddy, Camille & Butler, André, 2024. "Paving the road to re-election," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 239(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:239:y:2024:i:c:s0047272724001646
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2024.105228
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272724001646
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2024.105228?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Anjali Adukia & Sam Asher & Paul Novosad, 2020. "Educational Investment Responses to Economic Opportunity: Evidence from Indian Road Construction," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(1), pages 348-376, January.
    2. Sebastian Calonico & Matias D. Cattaneo & Rocio Titiunik, 2014. "Robust data-driven inference in the regression-discontinuity design," Stata Journal, StataCorp LP, vol. 14(4), pages 909-946, December.
    3. Ana L. De La O, 2013. "Do Conditional Cash Transfers Affect Electoral Behavior? Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Mexico," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 57(1), pages 1-14, January.
    4. Fay, Marianne & Martimort, David & Straub, Stéphane, 2021. "Funding and financing infrastructure: The joint-use of public and private finance," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 150(C).
    5. Manuel Bagues & Berta Esteve-Volart, 2016. "Politicians’ Luck of the Draw: Evidence from the Spanish Christmas Lottery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 124(5), pages 1269-1294.
    6. Shi, Min & Svensson, Jakob, 2006. "Political budget cycles: Do they differ across countries and why?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(8-9), pages 1367-1389, September.
    7. Robin Burgess & Remi Jedwab & Edward Miguel & Ameet Morjaria & Gerard Padró i Miquel, 2015. "The Value of Democracy: Evidence from Road Building in Kenya," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(6), pages 1817-1851, June.
    8. Besley, Timothy & Persson, Torsten & Sturm, Daniel, 2010. "Political competition, policy and growth: theory and evidence from the United States," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 121718, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    9. Marco Manacorda & Edward Miguel & Andrea Vigorito, 2011. "Government Transfers and Political Support," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 1-28, July.
    10. Mahadevan, Meera & Shenoy, Ajay, 2023. "The political consequences of resource scarcity: Targeted spending in a water-stressed democracy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 220(C).
    11. Daron Acemoglu & Suresh Naidu & Pascual Restrepo & James A. Robinson, 2019. "Democracy Does Cause Growth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 127(1), pages 47-100.
    12. Imbens, Guido W. & Lemieux, Thomas, 2008. "Regression discontinuity designs: A guide to practice," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 142(2), pages 615-635, February.
    13. Andrew Gelman & Guido Imbens, 2019. "Why High-Order Polynomials Should Not Be Used in Regression Discontinuity Designs," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 37(3), pages 447-456, July.
    14. Banerjee, Abhijit & Somanathan, Rohini, 2007. "The political economy of public goods: Some evidence from India," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 287-314, March.
    15. Sebastian Calonico & Matias D Cattaneo & Max H Farrell, 2020. "Optimal bandwidth choice for robust bias-corrected inference in regression discontinuity designs," The Econometrics Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 23(2), pages 192-210.
    16. World Bank, 2017. "State of Electricity Access Report 2017," World Bank Publications - Reports 26646, The World Bank Group.
    17. Khanna, Gaurav & Mukherjee, Priya, 2023. "Political accountability for populist policies: Lessons from the world’s largest democracy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 219(C).
    18. William D. Nordhaus, 1975. "The Political Business Cycle," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 42(2), pages 169-190.
    19. Eduardo Engel & Ronald Fischer & Alexander Galetovic, 2022. "Private Finance of Public Infrastructure," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 14(1), pages 319-335, November.
    20. Brender, Adi & Drazen, Allan, 2005. "Political budget cycles in new versus established democracies," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(7), pages 1271-1295, October.
    21. Mevlude Akbulut-Yuksel & Dozie Okoye & Belgi Turan, 2024. "Expressway to Votes: Infrastructure Projects and Voter Persuasion," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 134(657), pages 48-94.
    22. Adi Brender & Allan Drazen, 2008. "How Do Budget Deficits and Economic Growth Affect Reelection Prospects? Evidence from a Large Panel of Countries," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(5), pages 2203-2220, December.
    23. Sam Asher & Paul Novosad, 2020. "Rural Roads and Local Economic Development," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(3), pages 797-823, March.
    24. Sam Asher & Tobias Lunt & Ryu Matsuura & Paul Novosad, 2021. "Development Research at High Geographic Resolution: An Analysis of Night-Lights, Firms, and Poverty in India Using the SHRUG Open Data Platform," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 35(4), pages 845-871.
    25. Vernon Henderson & Adam Storeygard & David N. Weil, 2011. "A Bright Idea for Measuring Economic Growth," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(3), pages 194-199, May.
    26. Lehne, Jonathan & Shapiro, Jacob N. & Vanden Eynde, Oliver, 2018. "Building connections: Political corruption and road construction in India," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 62-78.
    27. Laura Zimmermann, 2021. "The Dynamic Electoral Returns of a Large Antipoverty Program," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 103(5), pages 803-817, December.
    28. Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson & Daniel M. Sturm, 2010. "Political Competition, Policy and Growth: Theory and Evidence from the US," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 77(4), pages 1329-1352.
    29. Andrew Healy & Gabriel S. Lenz, 2014. "Substituting the End for the Whole: Why Voters Respond Primarily to the Election‐Year Economy," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 58(1), pages 31-47, January.
    30. Kaba, Mustafa, 2022. "Who buys vote-buying? How, how much, and at what cost?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 193(C), pages 98-124.
    31. McCrary, Justin, 2008. "Manipulation of the running variable in the regression discontinuity design: A density test," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 142(2), pages 698-714, February.
    32. Claudio Ferraz & Frederico Finan, 2011. "Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(4), pages 1274-1311, June.
    33. Wyatt Brooks & Kevin Donovan, 2020. "Eliminating Uncertainty in Market Access: The Impact of New Bridges in Rural Nicaragua," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(5), pages 1965-1997, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Gonzalez, Felipe & Prem, Mounu, 2025. "Government Support in Times of Crisis: Transfers and the Road to Socialism," OSF Preprints vnz6d_v1, Center for Open Science.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Quinckhardt, Matthias, 2023. "The value of a party: Local politics and the allocation of intergovernmental transfers," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).
    2. Galindo-Silva, Hector, 2015. "New parties and policy outcomes: Evidence from Colombian local governments," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 86-103.
    3. Basistha, Ahana & Dhillon, Amrita & Chaudhuri, Arka Roy, 2024. "Elections and Rural Road Construction: Evidence from India," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 712, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    4. Bernardo P. Schettini & Rafael Terra, 2020. "Electoral incentives and Public Employees’ Retirement Systems in Brazilian municipalities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 184(1), pages 79-103, July.
    5. Bonfatti, Andrea & Forni, Lorenzo, 2019. "Fiscal rules to tame the political budget cycle: Evidence from Italian municipalities," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    6. Andrea Bonfatti & Lorenzo Forni, 2016. "Do fiscal rules reduce the political cycle? Evidence from Italian municipalities," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0208, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
    7. Kalliyil, Muneer & Sahoo, Soham, 2024. "The Political Economy of Privatization of Education: Role of Local Politicians in India," IZA Discussion Papers 17527, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    8. Marcel Fafchamps & Julien Labonne, 2017. "Do Politicians’ Relatives Get Better Jobs? Evidence from Municipal Elections," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 33(2), pages 268-300.
    9. Prakash, Nishith & Rockmore, Marc & Uppal, Yogesh, 2019. "Do criminally accused politicians affect economic outcomes? Evidence from India," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 141(C).
    10. Conconi, Paola & DeRemer, David R. & Kirchsteiger, Georg & Trimarchi, Lorenzo & Zanardi, Maurizio, 2017. "Suspiciously timed trade disputes," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 57-76.
    11. Cazor Katz, Andre & Acuña, Hector & Carrasco, Diego & Carrasco, Martín, 2017. "Transferencias como Canal de Ventaja Electoral: El Caso de Chile [Discretionary Government Transfers to Catch Votes: The Case of Chile]," MPRA Paper 83668, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Michael Lokshin & Aylén Rodriguez‐Ferrari & Iván Torre, 2024. "Electoral cycles and public spending during the pandemic," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(3), pages 1077-1107, August.
    13. Çağatay Bircan & Orkun Saka, 2021. "Lending Cycles and Real Outcomes: Costs of Political Misalignment," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 131(639), pages 2763-2796.
    14. Piotr Danisewicz & Steven Ongena, 2024. "Fiscal transfers, local government, and entrepreneurship," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(3), pages 818-845, June.
    15. Duha T. Altindag & Naci Mocan, 2015. "Mobile Politicians: Opportunistic Career Moves and Moral Hazard," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 1518, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
    16. Fernando M. Aragon & Ricardo Pique, 2015. "Does politician’s experience matter? Evidence from Peruvian local governments," Discussion Papers dp15-10, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.
    17. Çağatay Bircan & Orkun Saka, 2021. "Lending Cycles and Real Outcomes: Costs of Political Misalignment," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 131(639), pages 2763-2796.
    18. Sam Asher & Paul Novosad, 2017. "Politics and Local Economic Growth: Evidence from India," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 229-273, January.
    19. Jain, Chandan & Kashyap, Shagun & Lahoti, Rahul & Sahoo, Soham, 2023. "The impact of educated leaders on economic development: Evidence from India," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 1068-1093.
    20. Khanna, Gaurav & Mukherjee, Priya, 2023. "Political accountability for populist policies: Lessons from the world’s largest democracy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 219(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public infrastructure; Voting; Roads; India;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H54 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Infrastructures
    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
    • O18 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Urban, Rural, Regional, and Transportation Analysis; Housing; Infrastructure
    • P43 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Finance; Public Finance

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:239:y:2024:i:c:s0047272724001646. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.