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The reform of passenger rail in Switzerland: More performance without competition

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  • Christian Desmaris

    (IEP Lyon - Sciences Po Lyon - Institut d'études politiques de Lyon - Université de Lyon, LET - Laboratoire d'économie des transports - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - ENTPE - École Nationale des Travaux Publics de l'État - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

The Swiss railway system is known for its high quality of service and integration in a particularly dense public transport system. People are generally less aware of ongoing institutional reform. This article strives to shed light on passenger transport reform, and more particularly on regional traffic. Which institutional frameworks are implicated? What have been the results obtained both for public finances and for travelers? What are the key elements for explaining recorded performance gains? What lessons could be drawn for railway reform? In summary, it appears that improved performance has been possible in Switzerland even in the absence of competition. These improvements are due to the nature of public governance and its impact on the various stakeholders. Public authorities have imposed ambitious but negotiated targets on operators, coupled with severe financial constraints, in a context of decentralization of public procurement. Given this new institutional framework, railway companies and especially the former state-owned railway, the national incumbent SBB have achieved significant productivity increases through management and technical innovation. Client satisfaction, at the heart of the reform, also contributes to these successes.

Suggested Citation

  • Christian Desmaris, 2014. "The reform of passenger rail in Switzerland: More performance without competition," Post-Print halshs-01077009, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01077009
    DOI: 10.1016/j.retrec.2014.09.055
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Matthias Aistleitner & Christian Grimm & Jakob Kapeller, 2018. "Auftragsvergabe, Leistungsqualitaet und Kostenintensitaet im Schienenpersonenverkehr. Eine internationale Perspektive," ICAE Working Papers 86, Johannes Kepler University, Institute for Comprehensive Analysis of the Economy.
    2. Mizutani, Fumitoshi & Uranishi, Shuji, 2020. "An analysis of the inter-effect of structural reforms and rail mode share," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
    3. Huber, Martin & Meier, Jonas & Wallimann, Hannes, 2022. "Business analytics meets artificial intelligence: Assessing the demand effects of discounts on Swiss train tickets," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 22-39.
    4. Merkert, Rico & Bushell, James & Beck, Matthew J., 2020. "Collaboration as a service (CaaS) to fully integrate public transportation – Lessons from long distance travel to reimagine mobility as a service," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 267-282.
    5. Florent Laroche & Ayana Lamatkhanova, 2022. "Exploring effects of competitive tender for users in the regional railway market: evidence from Europe," Post-Print halshs-02930832, HAL.
    6. Christian Desmaris & Guillaume Monchambert, 2021. "Regional Passenger Rail Efficiency: Measurement and Explanation in the case of France," Post-Print halshs-03118747, HAL.
    7. Tomeš, Zdeněk, 2017. "Do European reforms increase modal shares of railways?," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 143-151.
    8. von Arx, Widar & Thao, Vu Thi & Wegelin, Philipp & Maarfield, Simon & Frölicher, Jonas, 2018. "The development of international passenger rail services from 2007 to 2016: The case of Switzerland," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 326-336.
    9. Christian Desmaris & Guillaume Monchambert, 2021. "Regional Passenger Rail Efficiency: Measurement and Explanation in the case of France," Working Papers halshs-03118747, HAL.
    10. Wegelin, Philipp & von Arx, Widar, 2016. "The impact of alternative governance forms of regional public rail transport on transaction costs. Case evidence from Germany and Switzerland," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 133-142.
    11. Mu, Rui & de Jong, Martin & Ma, Yongchi & Xi, Bao, 2015. "Trading off public values in High-Speed Rail development in China," Journal of Transport Geography, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 66-77.
    12. Florent Laroche & Ayana Lamatkhanova, 2020. "Exploring effects of competitive tender for users in the regional railway market: evidence from Europe," Working Papers halshs-02930832, HAL.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Railway reform; Public governance; Contracts; Performance; Swiss; Regionalization;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • R48 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Economics - - - Government Pricing and Policy
    • R38 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location - - - Government Policy
    • H76 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Other Expenditure Categories
    • L92 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Railroads and Other Surface Transportation
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation

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