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Les attitudes sont-elles différentes face à la fraude fiscale et à la fraude sociale ?

Author

Listed:
  • Mathieu Lefebvre

    (CREPP - Center of Research in Public Economics and Population Economics - Université de Liège)

  • Pierre Pestieau

    (CREPP - Center of Research in Public Economics and Population Economics - Université de Liège, CORE - Center of Operation Research and Econometrics [Louvain] - UCL - Université Catholique de Louvain = Catholic University of Louvain, CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research)

  • Arno Riedl

    (The Maastricht University School of Business and Economics - Maastricht University [Maastricht])

  • Marie Claire Villeval

    (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

En période de crise économique, les besoins de l'Etat augmentent et l'assiette fiscale se réduit ; il est alors courant de voir resurgir dans le débat public la lutte contre les diverses formes de fraude qui réduisent les recettes publiques. Dans ce contexte, on oppose régulièrement fraude fiscale à fraude sociale et la discussion porte souvent sur l'importance relative de l'une et de l'autre. On entend par fraude fiscale le détournement illégal d'un système fiscal afin de ne pas contribuer au financement des charges publiques, et par fraude sociale le fait d'échapper au versement des prélèvements sociaux ou de bénéficier indûment de prestations sociales. Les deux formes de fraude se recoupent parfois. S'il est difficile de mesurer avec précision l'une et l'autre forme de fraude, on estime généralement que la fraude fiscale représente un manque à gagner pour l'Etat beaucoup plus important que la fraude sociale. Cependant, il est important de noter que ces deux types de fraude émanent certainement de populations aux caractéristiques différentes en termes d'activité et de ressources. Il est donc intéressant d'essayer d'identifier les facteurs explicatifs de ces deux types de fraude, à savoir s'ils répondent aux mêmes ressorts économiques et impératifs moraux. Des populations ou des groupes sont souvent stigmatisés pour pratiquer l'un ou l'autre type de fraude. Cet article se propose d'expliquer les facteurs menant à ces deux types de fraude et ce, à partir de données obtenues d'une expérience en laboratoire. De par ses exigences de contrôle et son artificialité, l'expérimentation de laboratoire peut contribuer à apporter des éléments de réponse. En effet, par le choix de valeurs de paramètres appropriées, elle permet de comparer directement les deux types de fraude du point de vue économique de façon à isoler des dimensions non-économiques de la prise de décision.

Suggested Citation

  • Mathieu Lefebvre & Pierre Pestieau & Arno Riedl & Marie Claire Villeval, 2013. "Les attitudes sont-elles différentes face à la fraude fiscale et à la fraude sociale ?," Post-Print halshs-00724736, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00724736
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00724736
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    Cited by:

    1. Masclet, David & Montmarquette, Claude & Viennot-Briot, Nathalie, 2019. "Can whistleblower programs reduce tax evasion? Experimental evidence," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
    2. Yannick Gabuthy & Nicolas Jacquemet, 2013. "Analyse économique du droit et méthode expérimentale," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00746617, HAL.
    3. repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00746617 is not listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    fraude fiscale; fraude sociale;

    JEL classification:

    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior

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