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Tax morale affects tax compliance: Evidence from surveys and an artefactual field experiment

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  • Cummings, Ronald G.
  • Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge
  • McKee, Michael
  • Torgler, Benno

Abstract

Our working hypothesis is that cross-cultural differences in tax compliance behavior have foundations in the institutions of tax administration and citizen assessment of the quality of governance. Tax compliance being a complex behavioral issue, its investigation requires use of a variety of methods and data sources. Results from artefactual field experiments conducted in countries with substantially different political histories and records of governance quality demonstrate that observed differences in tax compliance levels persist over alternative levels of enforcement. The experimental results are shown to be robust by replicating them for the same countries using survey response measures of tax compliance.

Suggested Citation

  • Cummings, Ronald G. & Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge & McKee, Michael & Torgler, Benno, 2009. "Tax morale affects tax compliance: Evidence from surveys and an artefactual field experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 447-457, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:70:y:2009:i:3:p:447-457
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