IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/hal-04012224.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Institutions to the rescue: Untangling industrial fragmentation, institutional misalignment, and political constraints in the Russian gas pipeline industry

Author

Listed:
  • Claude Ménard
  • Ivan Shabalov

    (Central Research Institute of Ferrous Metallurgy I.P. Bardina, Russia)

  • Andrey Shastitko

    (MSU - Lomonosov Moscow State University, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration)

Abstract

This article examines the institutional setting implemented by a fragmented industry to face a technologically and politically challenging environment. It does so through the lens of recent developments in new institutional economics building on the Williamsonian contributions about hybrid organizations and the Northian contributions about institutional layers. The resulting analytical framework throws light on the institutional design implemented by the Russian manufacturers of large diameter pipes, a strategic segment of the natural gas supply chain. Examination of this arrangement shows the key role of intermediary institutions, coined ‘meso-institutions,' in coordinating parties that nevertheless remain competitors. However, this ‘economizing strategy,' backed by the central government, collides with the ‘anti-monopoly' strategy that the same government intends to implement. Based on interviews and private and public data and documents, this narrative shows the impact of technology on organizational choices and the theoretical gains to be expected from differentiating institutional layers when it comes to understanding the many challenges an industry faces.

Suggested Citation

  • Claude Ménard & Ivan Shabalov & Andrey Shastitko, 2021. "Institutions to the rescue: Untangling industrial fragmentation, institutional misalignment, and political constraints in the Russian gas pipeline industry," Post-Print hal-04012224, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04012224
    DOI: 10.1016/j.erss.2021.102223
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04012224
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://hal.science/hal-04012224/document
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.erss.2021.102223?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Andrey Shastitko & Claude Ménard, 2017. "Discrete institutional alternatives: Theoretical and policy issues (Celebrating the 80 th anniversary of Ronald Coase's “Nature of the Firm”)," Post-Print hal-04011898, HAL.
    2. Luc Brès & Sébastien Mena & Marie‐Laure Salles‐Djelic, 2019. "Exploring the formal and informal roles of regulatory intermediaries in transnational multistakeholder regulation," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 13(2), pages 127-140, June.
    3. Elinor Ostrom, 2014. "Do institutions for collective action evolve?," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 3-30, April.
    4. Shelanski, Howard A & Klein, Peter G, 1995. "Empirical Research in Transaction Cost Economics: A Review and Assessment," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(2), pages 335-361, October.
    5. Idrisov Georgy & Gordeev Dmitry, 2017. "Theoretical and Practical Aspects of Natural Gas Pricing in Domestic and Foreign Markets: The Case of Russia," Working Papers wpaper-2017-274, Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy, revised 2017.
    6. Oliver E. Williamson, 2000. "The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(3), pages 595-613, September.
    7. Banterle, Alessandro & Stranieri, Stefanella, 2008. "The consequences of voluntary traceability system for supply chain relationships. An application of transaction cost economics," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 33(6), pages 560-569, December.
    8. Ménard, Claude & Kurdin, Alexander & Shastitko, Andrey, 2020. "Out by the door, in through the window: Politics and natural gas regulation in Russia," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    9. Paul L. Joskow, 2002. "Transaction Cost Economics, Antitrust Rules, and Remedies," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 18(1), pages 95-116, April.
    10. Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, 2007. "Vertical Integration and Firm Boundaries: The Evidence," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 45(3), pages 629-685, September.
    11. Joel Bothello & Afshin Mehrpouya, 2019. "Between regulatory field structuring and organizational roles: Intermediation in the field of sustainable urban development," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 13(2), pages 177-196, June.
    12. Matthias Finger & Rolf W. Künneke (ed.), 2011. "International Handbook of Network Industries," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 12961.
    13. North, Douglass C., 1971. "Institutional Change and Economic Growth," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 31(1), pages 118-125, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ménard, Claude & Kurdin, Alexander & Shastitko, Andrey, 2020. "Out by the door, in through the window: Politics and natural gas regulation in Russia," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    2. Claude Ménard, 2018. "Organization and governance in the agrifood sector: How can we capture their variety?," Agribusiness, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 34(1), pages 142-160, December.
    3. Robert Gibbons, 2010. "Transaction‐Cost Economics: Past, Present, and Future?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 112(2), pages 263-288, June.
    4. Ménard, Claude, 2017. "Meso-institutions: The variety of regulatory arrangements in the water sector," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 6-19.
    5. Claude Menard & Gaetano Martino & Gustavo Magalhães Oliveira & Annie Royer & Paula Sarita Bigio Schnaider & Maria Sylvia Macchione Saes, 2024. "How is food safety regulation implemented? The key role of meso-institutions assessed through a cross-country comparison," Food Security: The Science, Sociology and Economics of Food Production and Access to Food, Springer;The International Society for Plant Pathology, vol. 16(4), pages 1045-1058, August.
    6. Eirik G. Furubotn & Rudolf Richter, 2008. "The New Institutional Economics – A Different Approach To Economic Analysis," Economic Affairs, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(3), pages 15-23, September.
    7. Claude Ménard & Gaetano Martino & Gustavo Magalhães de Oliveira & Annie Royer & Maria Sylvia Macchione Saes & Paula Sarita Bigio Schnaider, 2022. "Governing food safety through meso‐institutions: A cross‐country analysis of the dairy sector," Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 44(4), pages 1722-1741, December.
    8. Sharon Novak & Scott Stern, 2008. "How Does Outsourcing Affect Performance Dynamics? Evidence from the Automobile Industry," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 54(12), pages 1963-1979, December.
    9. Yochanan Shachmurove, 2012. "Failing Institutions Are at the Core of the U.S. Financial Crisis," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-040, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    10. Yvrande-Billon, Anne & Menard, Claude, 2005. "Institutional constraints and organizational changes: the case of the British rail reform," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 56(4), pages 675-699, April.
    11. Susana López‐Bayón & Marta Fernández‐Barcala & Manuel González‐Díaz, 2020. "In search of agri‐food quality for wine: Is it enough to join a geographical indication?," Agribusiness, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 36(4), pages 568-590, October.
    12. Buchen, Clemens, 2010. "Emerging economic systems in Central and Eastern Europe – a qualitative and quantitative assessment," EconStor Theses, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, number 37141, September.
    13. Natalya Solodilova & Rustam Malikov & Konstantin Grishin, 2016. "Development of the Tools for the Assessment of the Influence of Administrative Regulation on the Business Efficiency in the Region," Economy of region, Centre for Economic Security, Institute of Economics of Ural Branch of Russian Academy of Sciences, vol. 1(4), pages 1001-1013.
    14. Garg, Shresth & Ghosh, Pulak & Tan, Brandon Joel, 2023. "Within firm supply chains: Evidence from India," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(C).
    15. Dermot Leahy & Catia Montagna, 2011. "Economising, Strategising and the Decision to Outsource," Discussion Papers 11/17, University of Nottingham, GEP.
    16. Stephen L. Vargo & Robert F. Lusch, 2016. "Institutions and axioms: an extension and update of service-dominant logic," Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, Springer, vol. 44(1), pages 5-23, January.
    17. Ji, Chen & de Felipe, Isabel & Briz, Julian & Trienekens, Jacques H., 2012. "An Empirical Study on Governance Structure Choices in China´s Pork Supply Chain," International Food and Agribusiness Management Review, International Food and Agribusiness Management Association, vol. 15(2), pages 1-32, May.
    18. Hobbs, J., 2018. "Transaction Costs, Institutions and the Organization of Supply Chains: Three Good Questions," 2018 Conference, July 28-August 2, 2018, Vancouver, British Columbia 277411, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
    19. Michael, Steven C., 2007. "Transaction cost entrepreneurship," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 412-426, May.
    20. Williamson, Oliver, 2009. "The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure: From Choice to Contract," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 6, pages 111-134, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Gas industry; Organizations; Institutions; Regulation; Governance; Political interference;
    All these keywords.

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04012224. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.