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Informational Lobbying and Legislative Voting

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  • Keith E. Schnakenberg

Abstract

I analyze a model of interest group influence on legislative voting through information transmission. The model shows how interest groups may craft different messages to target different winning coalitions in order to influence the outcome. If access to legislators is costly, then interest groups prefer to coordinate with allied legislators by providing them with information that helps them to persuade less sympathetic legislators. The model reconciles informational theories of lobbying with empirical evidence suggesting that interest groups predominantly lobby those who already agree with them. The model also makes new predictions about the welfare effects of interest group influence: From an ex ante perspective, informational lobbying negatively affects the welfare of legislators. The results highlight the need for more theories of persuasion that take collective choice institutions into account.

Suggested Citation

  • Keith E. Schnakenberg, 2017. "Informational Lobbying and Legislative Voting," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 61(1), pages 129-145, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:61:y:2017:i:1:p:129-145
    DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12249
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ding, Huihui & Pivato, Marcus, 2021. "Deliberation and epistemic democracy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 185(C), pages 138-167.
    2. Schnakenberg, Keith & Turner, Ian R, 2023. "Formal Theories of Special Interest Influence," SocArXiv 47e26, Center for Open Science.
    3. Andrea Gallice & Edoardo Grillo, 2022. "Legitimize through Endorsement," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 680 JEL Classification: C, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
    4. Kemal Kivanc Akoz & Arseniy Samsonov, 2023. "Bargaining over information structures," Discussion Papers 2301, Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Quantitative Social and Management Sciences.
    5. Thanh Le & Erkan Yalcin, 2023. "Lobbying, political competition and the welfare effect of campaign contribution tax," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 70(2), pages 158-179, May.
    6. Emiel Awad, 2020. "Persuasive Lobbying with Allied Legislators," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 64(4), pages 938-951, October.
    7. Daeyoung Jeong, 2017. "Using Cheap Talk to Polarize or Unify a Group of Decision Makers," Working Papers 2017-19, Economic Research Institute, Bank of Korea.
    8. Jeheung Ryu & Randall W. Stone, 2018. "Plaintiffs by proxy: A firm-level approach to WTO dispute resolution," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 273-308, June.
    9. Oskar Nupia & Francisco Eslava, 2022. "Campaign finance and welfare when contributions are spent on mobilizing voters," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 58(3), pages 589-618, April.
    10. Hye Young You, 2023. "Dynamic lobbying: Evidence from foreign lobbying in the U.S. Congress," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(2), pages 445-469, July.
    11. Zerbini, Antoine, 2023. "The Case for Lobbying Transparency," SocArXiv w6vam, Center for Open Science.
    12. Das Chaudhury, Ratul & Leister, C. Matthew & Rai, Birendra, 2023. "Influencing a polarized and connected legislature," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 833-850.
    13. Thomas Groll & Christopher J. Ellis, 2017. "Repeated Lobbying By Commercial Lobbyists And Special Interests," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(4), pages 1868-1897, October.
    14. Jeong, Daeyoung, 2019. "Using cheap talk to polarize or unify a group of decision makers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 50-80.
    15. Raghul S. Venkatesh, 2020. "Political activism and polarization," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(5), pages 1530-1558, September.
    16. Awad, Emiel & Minaudier, Clement, 2023. "Persuasive Lobbying and the Value of Connections," SocArXiv 8z4ax, Center for Open Science.
    17. Le, Thanh & Yalcin, Erkan, 2018. "Lobbying, campaign contributions, and electoral competition," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 559-572.
    18. Christian Salas, 2019. "Persuading policy-makers," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 31(4), pages 507-542, October.
    19. Keith E. Schnakenberg, 2017. "The downsides of information transmission and voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 173(1), pages 43-59, October.
    20. Bils, Peter & Duggan, John & Judd, Gleason, 2021. "Lobbying and policy extremism in repeated elections," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
    21. Clement Minaudier, 2022. "The Value of Confidential Policy Information: Persuasion, Transparency, and Influence," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(2), pages 570-612.
    22. Dellis, Arnaud, 2023. "Legislative informational lobbying," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).

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