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Social Epistemology

Author

Listed:
  • Franz Dietrich

    (CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Kai Spiekermann

    (LSE - London School of Economics and Political Science)

Abstract

Social epistemology studies knowledge in social contexts. Knowledge is 'social' when its holder communicates with or learns from others (Epistemology in groups), or when its holder is a group as a whole, literally or metaphorically (Epistemology of groups). Group knowledge can emerge explicitly, through aggregation procedures like voting, or implicitly, through institutions like deliberation or prediction markets. In the truth-tracking paradigm, group beliefs aim at truth, and group decisions at 'correctness', in virtue of external facts that are empirical or normative, real or constructed, universal or relativistic, etc. Procedures and institutions are evaluated by epistemic performance: Are they truth-conducive? Do groups become 'wiser' than their members? We review several procedures and institutions, discussing epistemic successes and failures. Jury theorems provide formal arguments for epistemic success. Some jury theorems misleadingly conclude that 'huge groups are infallible', an artifact of inappropriate premises. Others have defensible premises, and still conclude that groups outperform individuals, without being infallible.

Suggested Citation

  • Franz Dietrich & Kai Spiekermann, 2021. "Social Epistemology," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-02431971, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-02431971
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-02431971
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. List, Christian, 2004. "A Model of Path-Dependence in Decisions over Multiple Propositions," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 98(3), pages 495-513, August.
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    1. Ding, Huihui & Pivato, Marcus, 2021. "Deliberation and epistemic democracy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 185(C), pages 138-167.

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