Masters of the universe: How power and accountability influence self-serving decisions under moral hazard
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DOI: 10.1037/a0031697
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- Melanie de Waal & Floor Rink & Janka Stoker & Dennis Veltrop, 2018. "How internal and external supervision impact the dynamics between boards and Top Management Teams and TMT reflexivity," DNB Working Papers 604, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
- Desai, Sreedhari D. & Kouchaki, Maryam, 2015. "Work-report formats and overbilling: How unit-reporting vs. cost-reporting increases accountability and decreases overbilling," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 79-88.
- Curtis L. Wesley & Gregory W. Martin & Darryl B. Rice & Connor J. Lubojacky, 2022. "Do the Right Thing: The Imprinting of Deonance at the Upper Echelons," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 180(1), pages 187-213, September.
- Matthew J. Quade & Rebecca L. Greenbaum & Mary B. Mawritz, 2019. "“If Only My Coworker Was More Ethical”: When Ethical and Performance Comparisons Lead to Negative Emotions, Social Undermining, and Ostracism," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 159(2), pages 567-586, October.
- Welton Chang & Pavel Atanasov & Shefali Patil & Barbara A. Mellers & Philip E. Tetlock, 2017. "Accountability and adaptive performance under uncertainty: A long-term view," Judgment and Decision Making, Society for Judgment and Decision Making, vol. 12(6), pages 610-626, November.
- Bixter, Michael T. & Luhmann, Christian C., 2014. "Shared losses reduce sensitivity to risk: A laboratory study of moral hazard," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 63-73.
- William T Self & Gregory Mitchell & Barbara A Mellers & Philip E Tetlock & J Angus D Hildreth, 2015. "Balancing Fairness and Efficiency: The Impact of Identity-Blind and Identity-Conscious Accountability on Applicant Screening," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 10(12), pages 1-17, December.
- Ajit Nayak, 2016. "Wisdom and the Tragic Question: Moral Learning and Emotional Perception in Leadership and Organisations," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 137(1), pages 1-13, August.
- Melanie de Waal & Floor Rink & Janka Stoker, 2015. "How internal and external supervisors influence employees' self-serving decisions," DNB Working Papers 464, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
- Schaerer, Michael & Kern, Mary & Berger, Gail & Medvec, Victoria & Swaab, Roderick I., 2018. "The illusion of transparency in performance appraisals: When and why accuracy motivation explains unintentional feedback inflation," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 171-186.
- Greg Fisher & Emily Neubert, 2023. "Evaluating Ventures Fast and Slow: Sensemaking, Intuition, and Deliberation in Entrepreneurial Resource Provision Decisions," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 47(4), pages 1298-1326, July.
- Hershcovis, M. Sandy & Neville, Lukas & Reich, Tara C. & Christie, Amy M. & Cortina, Lilia M. & Shan, J. Valerie, 2017.
"Witnessing wrongdoing: The effects of observer power on incivility intervention in the workplace,"
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 45-57.
- Hershcovis, M.S & Neville, L & Reich, Tara C. & Christie, A & Cortina, L.M & Shan, V, 2017. "Witnessing wrongdoing: the effects of observer power on incivility intervention in the workplace," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 83591, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Peecher, Mark E. & Solomon, Ira & Trotman, Ken T., 2013. "An accountability framework for financial statement auditors and related research questions," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 38(8), pages 596-620.
- Yu Zhou & Hongzhang Zhu & Jun Yang & Yunqing Zou, 2021. "Does CEO Power Backfire? The Impact of CEO Power on Corporate Strategic Change," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(16), pages 1-19, August.
- Williams, Melissa J. & Lopiano, Gabrielle & Heller, Daniel, 2022. "When the boss steps up: Workplace power, task responsibility, and engagement with unpleasant tasks," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 170(C).
- Muel Kaptein, 2017. "The Battle for Business Ethics: A Struggle Theory," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 144(2), pages 343-361, August.
- Lanaj, Klodiana & Johnson, Russell E. & Barnes, Christopher M., 2014. "Beginning the workday yet already depleted? Consequences of late-night smartphone use and sleep," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 124(1), pages 11-23.
- Virginia R. Stewart & Deirdre G. Snyder & Chia-Yu Kou, 2023. "We Hold Ourselves Accountable: A Relational View of Team Accountability," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 183(3), pages 691-712, March.
- Schaerer, Michael & du Plessis, Christilene & Yap, Andy J. & Thau, Stefan, 2018. "Low power individuals in social power research: A quantitative review, theoretical framework, and empirical test," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 73-96.
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More about this item
Keywords
moral hazard; accountability; power; investment decisions; unethical behavior;All these keywords.
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CTA-2013-04-27 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-EXP-2013-04-27 (Experimental Economics)
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