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Workers behavior and labor contract : an evolutionary approach

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  • Victor Hiller

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

Abstract

This article investigates the co-evolution of labor relationships and workers preferences. According to recent experimental economics findinggs on social preferences, the workforce is assumed to be heterogeneous. It is composed by both cooperative and non-cooperative workers. In addition, firms differ by the type of contract they offer (explicit or implicit). Finally, both the distribution of preferences and the degree of contractual completeness are endogeneized. Preferences evolve through a process of cultural transmission and the proportion of implicit contracts is driven by an evolutionary process. The complementarity between the transmission of cooperation and the implementation of implicit contracts leads to multiple equilibria which allow for path-dependence. This property is illustrated by the evolutions of American and Japanese labor contracts during the Twentieth century.

Suggested Citation

  • Victor Hiller, 2008. "Workers behavior and labor contract : an evolutionary approach," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00275734, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00275734
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00275734
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    Cited by:

    1. Gregory Ponthiere, 2011. "Mortality, Family and Lifestyles," Journal of Family and Economic Issues, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 175-190, June.
    2. Ricardo Azevedo Araujo & Helmar Nunes Moreira, 2014. "Lyapunov stability in an evolutionary game theory model of the labour market," Economia, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics], vol. 15(1), pages 41-53.
    3. Araujo, Ricardo Azevedo, 2011. "Lyapunov Stability in an Evolutionary Game Theory Model of the Labor Market," MPRA Paper 29957, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Explicit contract; implicit contract; cultural transmission; preferences for reciprocity; path dependence.; path dependence;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • Z10 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - General

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