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Using Laboratory Experiments to Design Efficient Market Institutions: The case of wholesale electricity markets

Author

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  • Carine Staropoli

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Celine Jullien

    (GAEL - Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée = Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory - UPMF - Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, MTS - Management Technologique et Strategique - EESC-GEM Grenoble Ecole de Management)

Abstract

This paper assesses the contribution of laboratory experiments to the economics of design applied to the electricity industry. The analysis is dedicated to wholesale markets, and reviews the results accumulated to date concerning both the general architecture of power markets and the very details of the market rules or institution, that is the auction rule. We argue that these experimental results contribute to a better understanding of the performances properties and implementation features of competitive market designs and that experimental economics has proven very useful to public authorities to inform the restructuring of electricity industry. It thus confirms the role of experimental economics as a complement to theoretical approaches in the design effort.

Suggested Citation

  • Carine Staropoli & Celine Jullien, 2006. "Using Laboratory Experiments to Design Efficient Market Institutions: The case of wholesale electricity markets," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00569121, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-00569121
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8292.2006.00319.x
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://hal.grenoble-em.com/hal-00569121
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rassenti, Stephen J & Smith, Vernon L & Wilson, Bart J, 2003. "Discriminatory Price Auctions in Electricity Markets: Low Volatility at the Expense of High Price Levels," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 109-123, March.
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    Cited by:

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    3. Jordi Brandts & Stanley S. Reynolds & Arthur Schram, 2014. "Pivotal Suppliers and Market Power in Experimental Supply Function Competition," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 124(579), pages 887-916, September.
    4. Christoph Engel & Klaus Heine, 2017. "The dark side of price cap regulation: a laboratory experiment," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 173(1), pages 217-240, October.
    5. Bastian Henze & Charles Noussair & Bert Willems, 2012. "Regulation of network infrastructure investments: an experimental evaluation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 1-38, August.
    6. Shawhan, Daniel L. & Messer, Kent D. & Schulze, William D. & Schuler, Richard E., 2011. "An experimental test of automatic mitigation of wholesale electricity prices," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 46-53, January.
    7. Gencer, Busra & van Ackere, Ann, 2021. "Achieving long-term renewable energy goals: Do intermediate targets matter?," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
    8. Charles A. Holt & William Shobe & Dallas Burtraw & Karen Palmer & Jacob K. Goeree, 2007. "Auction Design for Selling CO2 Emission Allowances Under the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative," Reports 2007-03, Center for Economic and Policy Studies.
    9. Arthur Schram & Aljaz Ule, 2013. "Democracy and Regulation: The Effects of Electoral Competition on Infrastructure Investments," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 13-046/I, Tinbergen Institute.

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