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An experimental test of automatic mitigation of wholesale electricity prices

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  • Shawhan, Daniel L.
  • Messer, Kent D.
  • Schulze, William D.
  • Schuler, Richard E.

Abstract

In several major deregulated electricity generation markets, the market operator uses an "automatic mitigation procedure" (AMP) to attempt to suppress the exercise of market power. A leading type of AMP compares the offer price from each generation unit with a recent historical average of accepted offer prices from that same unit during periods when there was no transmission-system congestion to impede competition. If one or more units' offer prices exceed the recent historical average by more than a specified margin, and if these offer prices raise the market-clearing price by more than a specified margin, the market operator replaces the offending offer prices with lower ones. In an experiment, we test an AMP of this type. We find that it keeps market prices close to marginal cost if generation owners have low market power in uncongested periods. However, with high market power in uncongested periods, a condition that may apply in many parts of the world, the generation owners are able to gradually raise the market price well above short-run marginal cost in spite of the AMP. We also test the effect of the AMP on the frequency with which high-variable-cost units are used, inefficiently, in place of low-variable-cost units.

Suggested Citation

  • Shawhan, Daniel L. & Messer, Kent D. & Schulze, William D. & Schuler, Richard E., 2011. "An experimental test of automatic mitigation of wholesale electricity prices," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 46-53, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:29:y:2011:i:1:p:46-53
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    8. Lynne Kiesling & Bart Wilson, 2007. "An experimental analysis of the effects of automated mitigation procedures on investment and prices in wholesale electricity markets," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 31(3), pages 313-334, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Sebastian Schwenen, 2015. "Strategic bidding in multi-unit auctions with capacity constrained bidders: the New York capacity market," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(4), pages 730-750, October.
    2. Jacqueline Adelowo & Moritz Bohland, 2022. "Redesigning Automated Market Power Mitigation in Electricity Markets," ifo Working Paper Series 387, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.
    3. Messer, Kent D. & Duke, Joshua M. & Lynch, Lori & Li, Tongzhe, 2017. "When Does Public Information Undermine the Efficiency of Reverse Auctions for the Purchase of Ecosystem Services?," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 212-226.

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