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Determinanten der Preisentwicklung auf dem deutschen Minutenreservemarkt

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  • Growitsch, Christian
  • Müller, Gernot
  • Rammerstorfer, Margarethe
  • Weber, Christoph

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  • Growitsch, Christian & Müller, Gernot & Rammerstorfer, Margarethe & Weber, Christoph, 2007. "Determinanten der Preisentwicklung auf dem deutschen Minutenreservemarkt," WIK Discussion Papers 300, WIK Wissenschaftliches Institut für Infrastruktur und Kommunikationsdienste GmbH.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:wikdps:300
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    1. Rassenti, Stephen J & Smith, Vernon L & Wilson, Bart J, 2003. "Discriminatory Price Auctions in Electricity Markets: Low Volatility at the Expense of High Price Levels," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 109-123, March.
    2. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & Marek Pycia & Marzena Rostek & Marek Weretka, 2014. "Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 81(4), pages 1366-1400.
    3. Paul Klemperer, 2002. "What Really Matters in Auction Design," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 169-189, Winter.
    4. Federico, Giulio & Rahman, David, 2003. "Bidding in an Electricity Pay-as-Bid Auction," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 175-211, September.
    5. Riedel, Stefan & Weigt, Hannes, 2007. "German Electricity Reserve Markets," MPRA Paper 65664, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Goswami, Gautam & Noe, Thomas H & Rebello, Michael J, 1996. "Collusion in Uniform-Price Auctions: Experimental Evidence and Implications for Treasury Auctions," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 9(3), pages 757-785.
    7. Prager, Robin A, 1992. "The Effects of Deregulating Cable Television: Evidence from the Financial Markets," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 347-363, December.
    8. John Sawkins, 1995. "Measuring the effects of regulation: an event study of the English and Welsh water industry," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 2(10), pages 359-362.
    9. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
    10. Klemperer, Paul D & Meyer, Margaret A, 1989. "Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly under Uncertainty," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(6), pages 1243-1277, November.
    11. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions and Bidding," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 25(2), pages 699-738, June.
    12. Koreisha, Sergio G. & Pukkila, Tarmo, 1998. "A two-step approach for identifying seasonal autoregressive time series forecasting models," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 483-496, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Wissner, Matthias, 2012. "Marktmacht auf dem Primär- und Sekundär-Regelenergiemarkt," WIK Discussion Papers 370, WIK Wissenschaftliches Institut für Infrastruktur und Kommunikationsdienste GmbH.
    2. Anell, Patrick & Zoz, Konrad, 2008. "Die Auswirkungen der Festnetzmobilfunksubstitution auf die Kosten des leitungsvermittelten Festnetzes," WIK Discussion Papers 304, WIK Wissenschaftliches Institut für Infrastruktur und Kommunikationsdienste GmbH.
    3. Justus Haucap, Ulrich Heimeshoff, and Dragan Jovanovic, 2014. "Competition in Germany's Minute Reserve Power Market: An Econometric Analysis," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 2).

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