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Veto Players Index: A New Measure of Constitution Rigidity

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  • Rola Nabil Kabbani

    (Faculty of Management Technology, The German University in Cairo)

Abstract

This research tests again the hypothesis of the relation between rigidity and amendment procedures. It tries to assess one more time, whether it holds empirically true that rigidity implies a minor amendment rate whilst flexibility permits a higher amendment rate. Several studies have tested this hypothesis yet there were no conclusive results. This research have developed a new index of constitution rigidity. It is based on the VP approach. This is the first index that included both de jure and de facto variables. De Jure variables are represented in the insti-tutional actors responsible for amendment ratification as stated in national constitutions. De facto variables represented in the partisan actors that might affect the ratification of the amendment. The interaction between these two actors defines the number of veto players. Following Henisz (2000) methodology in developing the index and adapt-ing it to constitution change. Once the index was developed, a regression analysis was run to test the robustness of our new index as a determinant for constitution rigidity.

Suggested Citation

  • Rola Nabil Kabbani, 2016. "Veto Players Index: A New Measure of Constitution Rigidity," Working Papers 40, The German University in Cairo, Faculty of Management Technology.
    • Handle: RePEc:guc:wpaper:40
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    File URL: http://mgt.guc.edu.eg/wpapers/040Kabbani_2016.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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