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Strategic candidacy and voting procedures

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  • DUTTA, Bhaskar

    (Indian Statistical Institute, 7 SJS Sansanwal Marg, New Delhi 110016, India)

  • JACKSON, Matthew O.

    (Humanities and Social Sci- ences, 228-77, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California 91125, USA)

  • LE BRETON, Michel

    (Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), Université catholique de Louvain (UCL), 1348 Louvain la Neuve, Belgium)

Abstract

We study the impact of considering the incentives of candidates to strategically affect the outcome of a voting procedure. First we show that every non-dictatorial voting procedure that satisfies unanimity, is open to strategic entry or exit by candidates: there necessarily exists some candidate can affect the outcome by entering or exiting the election, even when they do not win the election. Given that strategic candidacy always matters, we analyze the impact of strategic candidacy effects. We show that the equilibrium set of outcomes of the well-known voting by successive elimination procedure expands in a well-defined way when strategic candidacy is accounted for.

Suggested Citation

  • DUTTA, Bhaskar & JACKSON, Matthew O. & LE BRETON, Michel, 1999. "Strategic candidacy and voting procedures," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1999011, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:1999011
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