IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ecolet/v168y2018icp110-111.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A simple characterization of the anti-plurality rule

Author

Listed:
  • Kurihara, Takashi

Abstract

We axiomatize the anti-plurality rule by anonymity, neutrality, reinforcement, and new axioms, that is, averseness and bottoms-only. Averseness is a weaker axiom than faithfulness, and bottoms-only is the opposite of tops-only. Thus, we do not apply the characterization of a scoring social choice rule by anonymity, neutrality, reinforcement, and continuity to characterize the anti-plurality rule.

Suggested Citation

  • Kurihara, Takashi, 2018. "A simple characterization of the anti-plurality rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 110-111.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:168:y:2018:i:c:p:110-111
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.04.016
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176518301459
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.04.016?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sekiguchi, Yohei, 2012. "A characterization of the plurality rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(3), pages 330-332.
    2. Eyal Baharad & Shmuel Nitzan, 2005. "The inverse plurality rule—an axiomatization," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 25(1), pages 173-178, October.
    3. Hansson, Bengt & Sahlquist, Henrik, 1976. "A proof technique for social choice with variable electorate," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 193-200, October.
    4. Yohei Sekiguchi, 2012. "A Characterization of the Plurality Rule," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-833, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    5. Chun-Hsien Yeh, 2008. "An efficiency characterization of plurality rule in collective choice problems," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 34(3), pages 575-583, March.
    6. Ching, Stephen, 1996. "A Simple Characterization of Plurality Rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 298-302, October.
    7. Walter Bossert & Kotaro Suzumura, 2017. "The greatest unhappiness of the least number," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 49(3), pages 637-655, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Jac C. Heckelman & Robi Ragan, 2021. "Symmetric Scoring Rules And A New Characterization Of The Borda Count," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 59(1), pages 287-299, January.
    2. Federico Fioravanti & Ulle Endriss, 2024. "Voting with Partial Orders: The Plurality and Anti-Plurality Classes," Papers 2404.17413, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2024.
    3. Kurz, Sascha & Mayer, Alexander & Napel, Stefan, 2020. "Weighted committee games," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 282(3), pages 972-979.
    4. Kurihara, Takashi, 2018. "Axiomatic characterisations of the basic best–worst rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 172(C), pages 19-22.
    5. Jac C. Heckelman, 2023. "Negative voting social welfare functions: a characterization," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 27(1), pages 125-132, February.
    6. Salvatore Barbaro, 2024. "Electoral Methods and Political Polarization," Working Papers 2411, Gutenberg School of Management and Economics, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz.
    7. Federico Fioravanti & Ulle Endriss, 2024. "Voting with Partial Orders: The Plurality and Anti-Plurality Classes," Working Papers 329, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Hiroki Saitoh, 2022. "Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(1), pages 139-173, July.
    2. Walter Bossert & Kotaro Suzumura, 2017. "The greatest unhappiness of the least number," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 49(3), pages 637-655, December.
    3. Barberà, Salvador & Bossert, Walter, 2023. "Opinion aggregation: Borda and Condorcet revisited," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).
    4. Kurihara, Takashi, 2018. "Axiomatic characterisations of the basic best–worst rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 172(C), pages 19-22.
    5. Z. Emel Öztürk, 2020. "Consistency of scoring rules: a reinvestigation of composition-consistency," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(3), pages 801-831, September.
    6. Jac C. Heckelman, 2021. "Characterizing plurality using the majoritarian condition: a new proof and implications for other scoring rules," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 189(3), pages 335-346, December.
    7. Z. Emel Ozturk, 2017. "A composition-consistency characterization of the plurality rule," Working Papers 2017_04, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
    8. Salvador Barberà & Walter Bossert & Kotaro Suzumura, 2021. "Daunou’s voting rule and the lexicographic assignment of priorities," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 56(2), pages 259-289, February.
    9. Walter Bossert & Kotaro Suzumura, 2020. "Positionalist voting rules: a general definition and axiomatic characterizations," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 55(1), pages 85-116, June.
    10. Federico Fioravanti & Ulle Endriss, 2024. "Voting with Partial Orders: The Plurality and Anti-Plurality Classes," Papers 2404.17413, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2024.
    11. Sekiguchi, Yohei, 2012. "A characterization of the plurality rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(3), pages 330-332.
    12. Wesley H. Holliday & Eric Pacuit, 2023. "An extension of May's Theorem to three alternatives: axiomatizing Minimax voting," Papers 2312.14256, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2024.
    13. Federico Fioravanti & Ulle Endriss, 2024. "Voting with Partial Orders: The Plurality and Anti-Plurality Classes," Working Papers 329, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
    14. Kelly, Jerry S. & Qi, Shaofang, 2016. "Characterizing plurality rule on a fixed population," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 39-41.
    15. Eyal Baharad & Leif Danziger, 2018. "Voting in Hiring Committees: Which "Almost" Rule is Optimal?," CESifo Working Paper Series 6851, CESifo.
    16. Baharad, Eyal & Danziger, Leif, 2018. "Voting in Hiring Committees: Which "Almost" Rule Is Optimal?," IZA Discussion Papers 11287, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    17. Pivato, Marcus, 2013. "Variable-population voting rules," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 210-221.
    18. Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge & Vorsatz, Marc, 2009. "Size approval voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1187-1210, May.
    19. Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge & Vorsatz, Marc, 2014. "Non-anonymous ballot aggregation: An axiomatic generalization of Approval Voting," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 69-78.
    20. Fasil Alemante & Donald E. Campbell & Jerry S. Kelly, 2016. "Characterizing the resolute part of monotonic social choice correspondences," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 62(4), pages 765-783, October.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Anti-plurality; Averseness; Bottoms-only;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:168:y:2018:i:c:p:110-111. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.