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Motivated Memory in Dictator Games

Author

Listed:
  • Chalotte Saucet

    (Univ. Lyon, ENS de Lyon, GATE UMR5824, 93 Chemin des Mouilles, F-69130, Ecully, France.)

  • Marie Claire Villeval

    (Univ Lyon, CNRS, GATE L-SE UMR 5824, F-69131 Ecully, France; IZA, Bonn, Germany)

Abstract

The memory people have of their past behavior is one of the main sources of information about themselves. To study whether people retrieve their memory self-servingly in social encounters, we designed an experiment in which participants play binary dictator games and then have to recall the amounts allocated to the receivers. We find evidence of motivated memory through selective recalls: dictators remember more their altruistic than their selfish choices. A causal effect of the responsibility of decisions is identified, as the recall asymmetry disappears when options are selected randomly by the computer program. Incentivizing memory accuracy increases the percentage of dictators’ correct recalls only when they behaved altruistically. In contrast, there is no clear evidence of motivated memory through biased, i.e., overly optimistic recalls: dictators recall selectively but they do not bias strategically the direction and magnitude of these recalls.

Suggested Citation

  • Chalotte Saucet & Marie Claire Villeval, 2018. "Motivated Memory in Dictator Games," Working Papers 1804, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
  • Handle: RePEc:gat:wpaper:1804
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    3. Georgia Michailidou & Hande Erkut, 2022. "Lie O'Clock: Experimental Evidence on Intertemporal Lying Preferences," Working Papers 20220076, New York University Abu Dhabi, Department of Social Science, revised Apr 2022.
    4. Adrian Hillenbrand & Eugenio Verrina, 2018. "The differential effect of narratives prosocial behavior," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2018_16, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, revised Jun 2020.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Motivated memory; selective recalls; self-image; dictator game; experiment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers

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