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Network Cognition

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  • Dessí, Roberta
  • goyal, sanjeev
  • Gallo, Edoardo

Abstract

We study individual ability to memorize and recall information about friendship networks using a combination of experiments and survey-based data. In the experiment subjects are shown a network, in which their location is exogenously assigned, and they are then asked questions about the network after it disappears. We find that subjects exhibit two main cognitive biases: (i) they underestimate the mean degree compared to the actual network and (ii) they underestimate (overestimate) the number of frequent (rare) degrees. We then analyze survey data from two `real' friendship networks from a Silicon Valley firm and from a University Research Center. We find, somewhat remarkably, that individuals in these real networks also exhibit these biases. The experiments yield three further findings: (iii) network cognition is affected by the subject's location, (iv) the accuracy of network cognition varies with the nature of the network, and (v) limitations in network cognition have payoff implications.

Suggested Citation

  • Dessí, Roberta & goyal, sanjeev & Gallo, Edoardo, 2012. "Network Cognition," CEPR Discussion Papers 8732, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8732
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Saucet, Charlotte & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2019. "Motivated memory in dictator games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 250-275.
    2. Mira Frick & Ryota Iijima & Yuhta Ishii, 2018. "Dispersed Behavior and Perceptions in Assortative Societies," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2128R2, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Oct 2021.
    3. Chalotte Saucet & Marie Claire Villeval, 2018. "Motivated Memory in Dictator Games," Working Papers 1804, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    4. Edoardo Gallo & Chang Yan, 2015. "Effciency and equilibrium in network games: An experiment," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1546, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    5. Syngjoo Choi & Edoardo Gallo & Shachar Kariv, 2015. "Networks in the laboratory," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1551, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    6. Gallo Edoardo, 2012. "Small World Networks with Segregation Patterns and Brokers," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(3), pages 1-46, September.

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    Keywords

    Cognition; Social Networks;

    JEL classification:

    • Z1 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics

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