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An Efficiency Rationale for the Bundling of Public Goods

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  • Peter Norman
  • Hanming Fang

Abstract

This paper studies the role of bundling in the efficient provision of excludable public goods. We show that bundling in the provision of unrelated public goods can enhance social welfare. With a large number of goods and agents, first best can be approximated with pure bundling. For a parametric class of problems with binary valuations, we characterize the optimal mechanism, and show that bundling alleviates the free riding problem in large economies and decreases the extent of use exclusions. Both results are related to the idea that bundling makes it possible to reduce the incidence of exclusions because the variance in the relevant valuations decreases

Suggested Citation

  • Peter Norman & Hanming Fang, 2004. "An Efficiency Rationale for the Bundling of Public Goods," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 458, Econometric Society.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecm:nasm04:458
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    Cited by:

    1. Hellwig, Martin F., 2005. "A utilitarian approach to the provision and pricing of excludable public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(11-12), pages 1981-2003, December.
    2. Hanming Fang & Peter Norman, 2010. "Optimal Provision of Multiple Excludable Public Goods," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(4), pages 1-37, November.
    3. Hanming Fang & Peter Norman, 2006. "To bundle or not to bundle," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(4), pages 946-963, December.
    4. Raoul Kübler & Rouven Seifert & Michael Kandziora, 2021. "Content valuation strategies for digital subscription platforms," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 45(2), pages 295-326, June.
    5. Feng Deng, 2008. "From property rights to urban institutions: an economic analysis of China's emerging urban institutions," Post-Communist Economies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 20(3), pages 347-361.
    6. Hellwig, Martin, 2004. "Optimal income taxation, public-goods provision and public-sector pricing : a contribution to the foundations of public economics," Papers 04-42, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
    7. Matsushima, Hitoshi & Miyazaki, Koichi & Yagi, Nobuyuki, 2010. "Role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(6), pages 2241-2259, November.
    8. Hitoshi Matsushima & Koichi Miyazaki & Nobuyuki Yagi, 2006. "Role of Linking Mechanisms in Multitask Agency with Hidden Information ( Revised as CARF-F-209(2010) )," CARF F-Series CARF-F-059, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
    9. Suman Ghosh & Alexander Karaivanov & Mandar Oak, 2007. "A Case for Bundling Public Goods Contributions," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(3), pages 425-449, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public goods provision; bundling; exclusion;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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