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The Changing Polarization of Party Ideologies: The Role of Sorting

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  • Satyajit Chatterjee
  • Burcu Eyigungor

Abstract

U.S. congressional roll-call voting records show that as polarization of the two parties along the economic dimension changes, polarization along the social/cultural dimension tends to change in the opposite direction. A model of party competition within a two-dimensional ideology space is developed in which party platforms are determined by voters who compose the party. It is shown that if distribution of voter preferences is radially symmetric, polarization of party ideologies along the two dimensions are inversely related, as observed. The model gives a remarkably good quantitative account of the historically observed movements in polarization along the two dimensions.

Suggested Citation

  • Satyajit Chatterjee & Burcu Eyigungor, 2023. "The Changing Polarization of Party Ideologies: The Role of Sorting," Working Papers 23-07, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedpwp:96169
    DOI: 10.21799/frbp.wp.2023.07
    Note: Superseded by WP 24-04: https://doi.org/10.21799/frbp.wp.2024.04
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    Cited by:

    1. Alvaro Aguirre, 2024. "Macro Implications of Inequality-driven Political Polarization," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 1011, Central Bank of Chile.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Polarization; Primaries; partisanship; partisan politics; Political Economy; partisan sorting;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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