Policy Inertia, Election Uncertainty, and Incumbency Disadvantage of Political Parties
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- Satyajit Chatterjee & Burcu Eyigungor, 2019. "Policy Inertia, Election Uncertainty and Incumbency Disadvantage of Political Parties," Working Papers 19-40, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
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Cited by:
- Marina Azzimonti & Laura Karpuska & Gabriel Mihalache, 2023.
"Bargaining Over Taxes And Entitlements In The Era Of Unequal Growth,"
International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 64(3), pages 893-941, August.
- Marina Azzimonti & Laura Karpuska & Gabriel Mihalache, 2022. "Bargaining over Taxes and Entitlements in the Era of Unequal Growth," NBER Working Papers 30044, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Satyajit Chatterjee & Burcu Eyigungor, 2023.
"The Changing Polarization of Party Ideologies: The Role of Sorting,"
Working Papers
23-07, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
- Satyajit Chatterjee & Burcu Eyigungor, 2024. "The Changing Polarization of Party Ideologies: The Role of Sorting," Working Papers 24-04, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
- Marina Azzimonti & Gabriel P. Mihalache & Laura Karpuska, 2020. "Bargaining over Taxes and Entitlements," NBER Working Papers 27595, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Delgado-Vega, Álvaro, 2024. "Persistence in power of long-lived parties," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 163(C).
- Dodlova, Marina & Zudenkova, Galina, 2021. "Incumbents’ performance and political extremism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
- Marina Azzimonti & Laura Karpuska & Gabriel Mihalache, 2020. "Bargaining over Mandatory Spending and Entitlements," Department of Economics Working Papers 20-02, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.
- Loeper, Antoine & Dziuda, Wioletta, 2024. "Voters and the trade-off between policy stability and responsiveness," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 232(C).
More about this item
Keywords
Rational partisan model; Policy inertia; Incumbency disadvantage; Election uncertainty; Policy extremism;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General
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