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Foreclosure delay and consumer credit performance

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Listed:
  • Paul S. Calem
  • Julapa Jagtiani
  • William W. Lang

Abstract

Superseded by Working Paper 15-24.The deep housing market recession from 2008 through 2010 was characterized by a steep increase in the number of foreclosures. Foreclosure timelines ? the length of time between initial mortgage delinquency and completion of foreclosure ? also expanded significantly, averaging up to three years in some states. Most individuals undergoing foreclosure are experiencing serious financial stress. However, extended foreclosure timelines enable mortgage defaulters to live in their homes without making housing payments until the completion of the foreclosure process, thus providing a liquidity benefit. This paper tests whether the resulting liquidity was used to help cure nonmortgage credit delinquency. The authors find a significant relationship between longer foreclosure timelines and household performance on nonmortgage consumer credit during and after the foreclosure process. Their results indicate that a longer period of nonpayment of housing-related expenses results in higher cure rates on delinquent nonmortgage debts and improved household balance sheets. Foreclosure delay may have mitigated the impact of the economic downturn on credit card default. However, credit card performance may deteriorate in the future as the current foreclosure backlog is cleared and the affected households once again incur housing expenses.

Suggested Citation

  • Paul S. Calem & Julapa Jagtiani & William W. Lang, 2014. "Foreclosure delay and consumer credit performance," Working Papers 14-8, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedpwp:14-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Jihad Dagher & Yangfan Sun, 2014. "Borrower Protection and the Supply of Credit: Evidence from Foreclosure Laws," IMF Working Papers 2014/212, International Monetary Fund.
    2. Drozd, Lukasz A. & Serrano-Padial, Ricardo, 2018. "Financial contracting with enforcement externalities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 153-189.
    3. Joanna Stavins, 2020. "Credit Card Debt and Consumer Payment Choice: What Can We Learn from Credit Bureau Data?," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 58(1), pages 59-90, August.
    4. Kim, Jiseob, 2015. "Household’s optimal mortgage and unsecured loan default decision," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 222-244.
    5. Lawrence Santucci, 2016. "What Happened to the Revolving Credit Card Balances of 2009?," Consumer Finance Institute discussion papers 16-1, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    6. Kim, Jiseob, 2019. "How foreclosure delays impact mortgage defaults and mortgage modifications," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 18-37.
    7. Vicki Been & Ingrid Ellen & David N. Figlio & Ashlyn Nelson & Stephen Ross & Amy Ellen Schwartz & Leanna Stiefel, 2021. "The Effects of Negative Equity on Children’s Educational Outcomes," NBER Working Papers 28428, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Yunchao, Cai & Abdullah Yusof, Selamah & Mohd Amin, Ruzita & Mohd Arshad, Mohd Nahar, 2020. "Household Debt and Household Spending Behavior: Evidence from Malaysia," Jurnal Ekonomi Malaysia, Faculty of Economics and Business, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, vol. 54(1), pages 111-120.
    9. Lei Ding, 2017. "Borrower credit access and credit performance after loan modifications," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 52(3), pages 977-1005, May.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mortgage Default; Foreclosure; Foreclosure Delay; Credit Card Default;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G02 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Behavioral Finance: Underlying Principles
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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