IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/23452.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

An Equilibrium Model of Housing and Mortgage Markets with State-Contingent Lending Contracts

Author

Listed:
  • Tomasz Piskorski
  • Alexei Tchistyi

Abstract

We develop a tractable general equilibrium framework of housing and mortgage markets with aggregate and idiosyncratic risks, costly liquidity and strategic defaults, empirically relevant informational asymmetries, and endogenous mortgage design. We show that adverse selection plays an important role in shaping the form of an equilibrium contract. If borrowers' homeownership values are known, aggregate wages and house prices determine the optimal state-contingent mortgage payments, which efficiently reduces the costs of liquidity default. However, when lenders are uncertain about homeownership values, the equilibrium contract only depends on house prices and takes the form of a home equity insurance mortgage (HEIM) that eliminates the strategic default option and insures the borrower's equity position. Interestingly, we show that widespread adoption of such loans has ambiguous effects on the homeownership rate and household welfare. In economies in which recessions are expected to be severe, the HEIM equilibrium Pareto dominates the equilibrium with fixed-rate mortgages. However, if economic downturns are not severe, HEIMs can lower the homeownership rate and make some marginal home buyers worse-off. We also note that adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) may share some benefits with HEIMs, which may help justify a high concentration of ARMs among riskier borrowers. Finally, we find that unrestricted competition between lenders may lead to a non-existence of equilibrium. This suggests that government-sponsored enterprises may stabilize mortgage markets by subsidizing certain mortgage contracts.

Suggested Citation

  • Tomasz Piskorski & Alexei Tchistyi, 2017. "An Equilibrium Model of Housing and Mortgage Markets with State-Contingent Lending Contracts," NBER Working Papers 23452, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:23452
    Note: AP CF PE
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w23452.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Igor Makarov & Guillaume Plantin, 2013. "Equilibrium Subprime Lending," Post-Print hal-03399484, HAL.
    2. John Y. Campbell & João F. Cocco, 2003. "Household Risk Management and Optimal Mortgage Choice," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 118(4), pages 1449-1494.
    3. Glaeser, Edward L. & Sinai, Todd (ed.), 2013. "Housing and the Financial Crisis," National Bureau of Economic Research Books, University of Chicago Press, number 9780226030586.
    4. Bruno Biais & Thomas Mariotti & Guillaume Plantin & Jean-Charles Rochet, 2007. "Dynamic Security Design: Convergence to Continuous Time and Asset Pricing Implications," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 74(2), pages 345-390.
    5. Tomasz Piskorski & Alexei Tchistyi, 2011. "Stochastic House Appreciation and Optimal Mortgage Lending," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 24(5), pages 1407-1446.
    6. Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro & Moore, John, 1997. "Credit Cycles," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 211-248, April.
    7. John Y. Campbell & João F. Cocco, 2015. "A Model of Mortgage Default," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 70(4), pages 1495-1554, August.
    8. Douglas W. Diamond, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414.
    9. Piskorski, Tomasz & Seru, Amit & Vig, Vikrant, 2010. "Securitization and distressed loan renegotiation: Evidence from the subprime mortgage crisis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(3), pages 369-397, September.
    10. Daniel L. Greenwald & Tim Landvoigt & Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh, 2021. "Financial Fragility with SAM?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 76(2), pages 651-706, April.
    11. Dunn, Kenneth B & Spatt, Chester S, 1985. "An Analysis of Mortgage Contracting: Prepayment Penalties and the Due-on-Sale Clause," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 40(1), pages 293-308, March.
    12. Zhiguo He & Konstantin Milbradt, 2014. "Endogenous Liquidity and Defaultable Bonds," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(4), pages 1443-1508, July.
    13. Sumit Agarwal & Gene Amromin & Itzhak Ben-David & Souphala Chomsisengphet & Tomasz Piskorski & Amit Seru, 2017. "Policy Intervention in Debt Renegotiation: Evidence from the Home Affordable Modification Program," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 125(3), pages 654-712.
    14. Emmanuel Farhi & Mikhail Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2009. "A Theory of Liquidity and Regulation of Financial Intermediation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 76(3), pages 973-992.
    15. Igor Makarov & Guillaume Plantin, 2013. "Equilibrium Subprime Lending," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 68(3), pages 849-879, June.
    16. Richard Stanton & Nancy Wallace, 1998. "Mortgage Choice: What's the Point?," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 26(2), pages 173-205, June.
    17. Christopher Mayer & Edward Morrison & Tomasz Piskorski & Arpit Gupta, 2014. "Mortgage Modification and Strategic Behavior: Evidence from a Legal Settlement with Countrywide," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(9), pages 2830-2857, September.
    18. Rodney Ramcharan & Amir Kermani & Marco Di Maggio, 2015. "Monetary Policy Pass-Through: Household Consumption and Voluntary Deleveraging," 2015 Meeting Papers 256, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    19. Shiller, Robert J & Weiss, Allan N, 1999. "Home Equity Insurance," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 21-47, July.
    20. Marco Di Maggio & Amir Kermani & Benjamin J. Keys & Tomasz Piskorski & Rodney Ramcharan & Amit Seru & Vincent Yao, 2017. "Interest Rate Pass-Through: Mortgage Rates, Household Consumption, and Voluntary Deleveraging," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(11), pages 3550-3588, November.
    21. Markus K. Brunnermeier & Yuliy Sannikov, 2014. "A Macroeconomic Model with a Financial Sector," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(2), pages 379-421, February.
    22. Bolton, Patrick & Scharfstein, David S, 1990. "A Theory of Predation Based on Agency Problems in Financial Contracting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 93-106, March.
    23. repec:ucp:bkecon:9780226081946 is not listed on IDEAS
    24. Tomasz Piskorski & Amit Seru & James Witkin, 2015. "Asset Quality Misrepresentation by Financial Intermediaries: Evidence from the RMBS Market," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 70(6), pages 2635-2678, December.
    25. Christopher Mayer & Karen Pence & Shane M. Sherlund, 2009. "The Rise in Mortgage Defaults," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 23(1), pages 27-50, Winter.
    26. Benjamin J. Keys & Tomasz Piskorski & Amit Seru & Vincent Yao, 2014. "Mortgage Rates, Household Balance Sheets, and the Real Economy," NBER Working Papers 20561, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    27. Edward L. Glaeser & Todd Sinai, 2013. "Housing and the Financial Crisis," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number glae11-1.
    28. Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 90(4), pages 629-649.
    29. PETER M. DeMARZO & YULIY SANNIKOV, 2006. "Optimal Security Design and Dynamic Capital Structure in a Continuous‐Time Agency Model," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(6), pages 2681-2724, December.
    30. Johannes Stroebel, 2016. "Asymmetric Information about Collateral Values," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 71(3), pages 1071-1112, June.
    31. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
    32. Benjamin J. Keys & Tanmoy Mukherjee & Amit Seru & Vikrant Vig, 2010. "Did Securitization Lead to Lax Screening? Evidence from Subprime Loans," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 125(1), pages 307-362.
    33. John M. Griffin & Gonzalo Maturana, 2016. "Editor's Choice Who Facilitated Misreporting in Securitized Loans?," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 29(2), pages 384-419.
    34. repec:bla:jfinan:v:44:y:1989:i:2:p:499-508 is not listed on IDEAS
    35. Adriano A. Rampini & S. Viswanathan, 2010. "Collateral, Risk Management, and the Distribution of Debt Capacity," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 65(6), pages 2293-2322, December.
    36. Mark J. Garmaise, 2015. "Borrower Misreporting and Loan Performance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 70(1), pages 449-484, February.
    37. Sumit Agarwal & Gene Amromin & Souphala Chomsisengphet & Tim Landvoigt & Tomasz Piskorski & Amit Seru & Vincent Yao, 2015. "Mortgage Refinancing, Consumer Spending, and Competition: Evidence from the Home Affordable Refinancing Program," NBER Working Papers 21512, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Therese C. Scharlemann & Stephen H. Shore, 2022. "The effect of changing mortgage payments on default and prepayment: Evidence from HAMP resets," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 50(5), pages 1231-1256, September.
    2. Piskorski, Tomasz & Seru, Amit, 2021. "Debt relief and slow recovery: A decade after Lehman," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 141(3), pages 1036-1059.
    3. Barney Hartman‐Glaser & Benjamin Hébert, 2020. "The Insurance Is the Lemon: Failing to Index Contracts," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 75(1), pages 463-506, February.
    4. Matteo Benetton & Philippe Bracke & João F Cocco & Nicola Garbarinoifo, 2022. "Housing Consumption and Investment: Evidence from Shared Equity Mortgages," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 35(8), pages 3525-3573.
    5. Adam M. Guren & Arvind Krishnamurthy & Timothy J. Mcquade, 2021. "Mortgage Design in an Equilibrium Model of the Housing Market," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 76(1), pages 113-168, February.
    6. John Y. Campbell & Nuno Clara & João F. Cocco, 2021. "Structuring Mortgages for Macroeconomic Stability," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 76(5), pages 2525-2576, October.
    7. David C. Ling & Andy Naranjo & Benjamin Scheick, 2021. "There is no place like home: Information asymmetries, local asset concentration, and portfolio returns," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 49(1), pages 36-74, March.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Alexei Tchistyi, 2018. "An Equilibrium Model of Housing and Mortgage Markets with State-Contingent Lending Contracts," 2018 Meeting Papers 244, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    2. Piskorski, Tomasz & Seru, Amit, 2021. "Debt relief and slow recovery: A decade after Lehman," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 141(3), pages 1036-1059.
    3. Benjamin J. Keys & Tomasz Piskorski & Amit Seru & Vikrant Vig, 2012. "Mortgage Financing in the Housing Boom and Bust," NBER Chapters, in: Housing and the Financial Crisis, pages 143-204, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Tomasz Piskorski & Amit Seru, 2018. "Mortgage Market Design: Lessons from the Great Recession," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 49(1 (Spring), pages 429-513.
    5. repec:bin:bpeajo:v:49:y:2019:i:2018-01:p:429-513 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Greg Buchak & Gregor Matvos & Tomasz Piskorski & Amit Seru, 2024. "Beyond the Balance Sheet Model of Banking: Implications for Bank Regulation and Monetary Policy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 132(2), pages 616-693.
    7. Francisco Gomes & Michael Haliassos & Tarun Ramadorai, 2021. "Household Finance," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 59(3), pages 919-1000, September.
    8. Hanming Fang & You Suk Kim & Wenli Li, 2016. "The dynamics of subprime adjustable-rate mortgage default: a structural estimation," Working Papers 16-2, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    9. Adam M. Guren & Arvind Krishnamurthy & Timothy J. Mcquade, 2021. "Mortgage Design in an Equilibrium Model of the Housing Market," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 76(1), pages 113-168, February.
    10. Pagès, Henri, 2013. "Bank monitoring incentives and optimal ABS," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 30-54.
    11. John Y. Campbell, 2013. "Mortgage Market Design," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 17(1), pages 1-33.
    12. Giovanni Favara & Mariassunta Giannetti, 2017. "Forced Asset Sales and the Concentration of Outstanding Debt: Evidence from the Mortgage Market," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 72(3), pages 1081-1118, June.
    13. Gene Amromin & Jennifer Huang & Clemens Sialm & Edward Zhong, 2018. "Complex Mortgages [Why don’t lenders renegotiate more home mortgages? Redefaults, self-cures, and securitization]," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 22(6), pages 1975-2007.
    14. Sumit Agarwal & Gene Amromin & Souphala Chomsisengphet & Tim Landvoigt & Tomasz Piskorski & Amit Seru & Vincent Yao, 2015. "Mortgage Refinancing, Consumer Spending, and Competition: Evidence from the Home Affordable Refinancing Program," NBER Working Papers 21512, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Sumit Agarwal & Itzhak Ben-David & Vincent Yao, 2015. "Collateral Valuation and Borrower Financial Constraints: Evidence from the Residential Real Estate Market," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 61(9), pages 2220-2240, September.
    16. Benjamin J. Keys & Tomasz Piskorski & Amit Seru & Vincent Yao, 2014. "Mortgage Rates, Household Balance Sheets, and the Real Economy," NBER Working Papers 20561, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Markus K. Brunnermeier & Thomas M. Eisenbach & Yuliy Sannikov, 2012. "Macroeconomics with Financial Frictions: A Survey," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000384, David K. Levine.
    18. John Y. Campbell & Nuno Clara & João F. Cocco, 2021. "Structuring Mortgages for Macroeconomic Stability," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 76(5), pages 2525-2576, October.
    19. Christopher J. Mayer & Tomasz Piskorski & Alexei Tchistyi, 2010. "The Inefficiency of Refinancing: Why Prepayment Penalties Are Good for Risky Borrowers," NBER Working Papers 16586, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. Richard Chamboko & Jorge Miguel Bravo, 2020. "A Multi-State Approach to Modelling Intermediate Events and Multiple Mortgage Loan Outcomes," Risks, MDPI, vol. 8(2), pages 1-29, June.
    21. Buchak, Greg & Matvos, Gregor & Piskorski, Tomasz & Seru, Amit, 2018. "Fintech, regulatory arbitrage, and the rise of shadow banks," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 130(3), pages 453-483.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D1 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior
    • D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:23452. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/nberrus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.