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The cost of delay

Author

Listed:
  • Lawrence R. Cordell
  • Liang Geng
  • Laurie Goodman
  • Lidan Yang

Abstract

In this study, we make use of a massive database of mortgage defaults to estimate REO liquidation timelines and time-related costs resulting from the recent post-crisis interventions in the mortgage market and the freezing of foreclosures due to ?robo-signing? revelations. The cost of delay, estimated by comparing today?s time-related costs to those before the start of the financial crisis, is eight percentage points, with enormous variation among states. While costs are estimated to be four percentage points higher in statutory foreclosure states, they are estimated to be 13 percentage points higher in judicial foreclosure states and 19 percentage points higher in the highest-cost state, New York. We discuss the policy implications of these extraordinary increases in time-related costs, including recent actions by the GSEs to raise their guarantee fees 15-30 basis points in five high-cost judicial states. Combined with evidence that foreclosure delays do not improve outcomes for borrowers and that increased delays can have large negative externalities in neighborhoods, the weight of the evidence is that current foreclosure practices merit the urgent attention of policymakers.

Suggested Citation

  • Lawrence R. Cordell & Liang Geng & Laurie Goodman & Lidan Yang, 2013. "The cost of delay," Working Papers 13-15, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedpwp:13-15
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Anthony Pennington-Cross, 2010. "The Duration of Foreclosures in the Subprime Mortgage Market: A Competing Risks Model with Mixing," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 40(2), pages 109-129, February.
    2. Atif Mian & Amir Sufi & Francesco Trebbi, 2015. "Foreclosures, House Prices, and the Real Economy," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 70(6), pages 2587-2634, December.
    3. Clauretie, Terrence M & Herzog, Thomas N, 1990. "The Effect of State Foreclosure Laws on Loan Losses: Evidence from the Mortgage Insurance Industry," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 22(2), pages 221-233, May.
    4. Karen M. Pence, 2006. "Foreclosing on Opportunity: State Laws and Mortgage Credit," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 88(1), pages 177-182, February.
    5. Gerardi, Kristopher & Lambie-Hanson, Lauren & Willen, Paul S., 2013. "Do borrower rights improve borrower outcomes? Evidence from the foreclosure process," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 1-17.
    6. Lauren Lambie-Hanson, 2013. "When does delinquency result in neglect?: mortgage delinquency and property maintenance," Public Policy Discussion Paper 13-1, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
    7. Richard A. Phillips & James H. VanderHoff, 2004. "The Conditional Probability of Foreclosure: An Empirical Analysis of Conventional Mortgage Loan Defaults," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 32(4), pages 571-587, December.
    8. Richard A. Phillips & Eric M. Rosenblatt, 1997. "The Legal Environment and the Choice of Default Resolution Alternatives: An Empirical Analysis," Journal of Real Estate Research, American Real Estate Society, vol. 13(2), pages 145-154.
    9. J. Michael Collins & Ken Lam & Christopher E. Herbert, 2011. "State mortgage foreclosure policies and lender interventions: Impacts on borrower behavior in default," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 30(2), pages 216-232, March.
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    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. Foreclosure procedures last too long
      by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2013-05-28 19:17:00

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    Cited by:

    1. Kyle Herkenhoff & Lee Ohanian, 2019. "The Impact of Foreclosure Delay on U.S. Employment," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 31, pages 63-83, January.
    2. Paul S. Calem & Julapa Jagtiani & William W. Lang, 2017. "Foreclosure Delay and Consumer Credit Performance," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 52(3), pages 225-251, December.
    3. Marcus Hagedorn & Fatih Karahan & Iourii Manovskii & Kurt Mitman, 2013. "Unemployment Benefits and Unemployment in the Great Recession: The Role of Macro Effects," NBER Working Papers 19499, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Marcus Hagedorn & Fatih Karahan & Iourii Manovskii & Kurt Mitman, 2013. "Unemployment Benefits and Unemployment in the Great Recession: The Role of Equilibrium Effects," Staff Reports 646, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    5. Tsai, Ming Shann & Chiang, Shu Ling & Miller, Chen, 2016. "A study on the distribution of the foreclosure lag, its expected capital opportunity cost and its analyses," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 156-170.

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    Keywords

    Mortgages; Foreclosure;

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