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Do Borrower Rights Improve Borrower Outcomes? Evidence from the Foreclosure Process

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  • Kristopher Gerardi
  • Lauren Lambie-Hanson
  • Paul S. Willen

Abstract

We evaluate laws designed to protect borrowers from foreclosure. We find that these laws delay but do not prevent foreclosures. We first compare states that require lenders to seek judicial permission to foreclose with states that do not. Borrowers in judicial states are no more likely to cure and no more likely to renegotiate their loans, but the delays lead to a build-up in these states of persistently delinquent borrowers, the vast majority of whom eventually lose their homes. We next analyze a "right-to-cure" law instituted in Massachusetts on May 1, 2008. Using a difference-in-differences approach to evaluate the effect of the policy, we compare Massachusetts with neighboring states that did not adopt similar laws. We find that the right-to-cure law lengthens the foreclosure timeline but does not lead to better outcomes for borrowers.

Suggested Citation

  • Kristopher Gerardi & Lauren Lambie-Hanson & Paul S. Willen, 2011. "Do Borrower Rights Improve Borrower Outcomes? Evidence from the Foreclosure Process," NBER Working Papers 17666, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17666
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    1. Anthony Pennington-Cross, 2010. "The Duration of Foreclosures in the Subprime Mortgage Market: A Competing Risks Model with Mixing," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 40(2), pages 109-129, February.
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    7. Adelino, Manuel & Gerardi, Kristopher & Willen, Paul S., 2013. "Why don't Lenders renegotiate more home mortgages? Redefaults, self-cures and securitization," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(7), pages 835-853.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
    • K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
    • R31 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location - - - Housing Supply and Markets

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