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Brexit negotiations: From negotiation space to agreement zones

Author

Listed:
  • Ursula F Ott

    (Nottingham Trent University)

  • Pervez N Ghauri

    (University of Birmingham)

Abstract

Brexit is decidedly a “big question”. We agree with International Business scholars who say that such questions need to be addressed using an inter-disciplinary approach. We use bargaining theory models of rational behavior and the negotiation literature to explain various Brexit options and predict their consequences. Considering the lack of relevant experiential knowledge, and the multidimensional high-stakes negotiations underway, it is little wonder that anxiety is growing across all 28 European Union member states. Our analysis supports a coherent approach from rational bargaining model to real-life international negotiation. We position outcome scenarios in different agreement zones and explore their ramifications.

Suggested Citation

  • Ursula F Ott & Pervez N Ghauri, 2019. "Brexit negotiations: From negotiation space to agreement zones," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 50(1), pages 137-149, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:pal:jintbs:v:50:y:2019:i:1:d:10.1057_s41267-018-0189-x
    DOI: 10.1057/s41267-018-0189-x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Gammeltoft, Peter & Panibratov, Andrei, 2024. "Emerging market multinationals and the politics of internationalization," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(3).
    2. Caterina Moschieri & Daniel J. Blake, 2019. "The organizational implications of Brexit," Journal of Organization Design, Springer;Organizational Design Community, vol. 8(1), pages 1-9, December.
    3. Haoqiang Li & Jihong Chen & Zheng Wan & Huaxin Zhang & Maoxin Wang & Yun Bai, 2020. "Spatial evaluation of knowledge spillover benefits in China’s free trade zone provinces and cities," Growth and Change, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 1158-1181, September.
    4. Rammal, Hussain G. & Rose, Elizabeth L. & Ghauri, Pervez N. & Ørberg Jensen, Peter D. & Kipping, Matthias & Petersen, Bent & Scerri, Moira, 2022. "Economic nationalism and internationalization of services: Review and research agenda," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 57(3).
    5. Zhang, Zhi-Xue & Liu, Leigh Anne & Ma, Li, 2021. "Negotiation beliefs: Comparing Americans and the Chinese," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 30(5).

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