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Corporate Governance and Employees in Germany: Changing Linkages, Complementarities, and Tensions

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  • Gregory Jackson
  • Martin Hopner
  • Antje Kurdelbusch

Abstract

This article examines institutional linkages between corporate governance and labour management in Germany. German corporate governance was characterised by the importance of banks, ownership concentration, long-term investment, and stable corporate networks. This system displayed important complementarities with stable long-term employment, investment in worker training, flexible quality production, low variability and dispersion in pay, and cooperative industrial relations during the post-war period. Since the mid-1990s, corporate governance has changed dramatically - a decline in the role of banks, the unwinding of corporate networks, the rise of foreign and institutional investors, en emerging market for corporate control, and changing careers and compensation of top managers. The paper investigates the resulting introduction of shareholder-value management practices and their impact on employees in large German companies. The findings show that these changes are related to the shrinking of stable core employment and the growth of variable pay. However, such tensions with shareholder value management have not undermined employee codetermination and collective bargaining institutions. Both play an important mediating role between capital market pressures and employment outcomes. The implications for the German "model" of corporate governance are discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Gregory Jackson & Martin Hopner & Antje Kurdelbusch, 2004. "Corporate Governance and Employees in Germany: Changing Linkages, Complementarities, and Tensions," Discussion papers 04008, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
  • Handle: RePEc:eti:dpaper:04008
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Chilosi, Alberto & Damiani, Mirella, 2007. "Stakeholders vs. shareholders in corporate governance," MPRA Paper 2334, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Peter Waring & Tony Edwards, 2008. "Socially Responsible Investment: Explaining its Uneven Development and Human Resource Management Consequences," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(3), pages 135-145, May.
    3. Ninghua Zhong & Shujing Wang & Rudai Yang, 2017. "Does Corporate Governance Enhance Common Interests of Shareholders and Primary Stakeholders?," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 141(2), pages 411-431, March.
    4. Steven M. Mintz, 2005. "Corporate Governance in an International Context: legal systems, financing patterns and cultural variables," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(5), pages 582-597, September.
    5. Ferguson-Cradler, Gregory, 2022. "Corporate strategy in the Anthropocene: German electricity utilities and the nuclear sudden stop," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 195(C).
    6. Gregory Jackson, 2004. "Contested Boundaries: Ambiguity and Creativity in the Evolution of German Codetermination," Discussion papers 04022, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    7. Lantenois, Christopher, 2010. "Direction des sociétés, modèle de reproduction des élites managériales et financiarisation du capitalisme allemand : Enseignements à partir d’un panel de vingt-cinq sociétés cotées," Revue de la Régulation - Capitalisme, institutions, pouvoirs, Association Recherche et Régulation, vol. 8.
    8. Isabelle Chambost & Christian Hoarau & Patrick Roturier & Pascal Pons & Emmanuel Tarrière, 2008. "Financiarisation des entreprises et dialogue social : rapport final," Working Papers hal-03135076, HAL.
    9. Gregory Jackson, 2004. "Toward a Comparative Perspective on Corporate Governance and Labour Management," Discussion papers 04023, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).

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