Elections, Contracts and Markets
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- Gersbach, Hans & Müller, Markus, 2006. "Elections, Contracts and Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 5717, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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- Balistreri, Edward J. & Hillberry, Russell H. & Rutherford, Thomas F., 2011.
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- Balistreri, Edward J. & Hillberry, Russell H. & Rutherford, Thomas F., 2007. "Structural Estimation and Solution of International Trade Models with Heterogeneous Firms," Conference papers 331590, Purdue University, Center for Global Trade Analysis, Global Trade Analysis Project.
- Edward J. Balistreri & Russell H. Hillberry & Thomas F. Rutherford, 2008. "Structural Estimation and Solution of International Trade Models with Heterogeneous Firms," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1056, The University of Melbourne.
- Russell H. Hillberry & Edward J. Balistreri & Thomas F. Rutherford, 2007. "Structural Estimation and Solution of International Trade Models with Heterogeneous Firms," DEGIT Conference Papers c012_038, DEGIT, Dynamics, Economic Growth, and International Trade.
- Edward J. Balistreri & Russell H. Hillberry & Thomas F. Rutherford, 2008. "Structural Estimation and Solution of International Trade Models with Heterogeneous Firms," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 08/89, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
- Hans Gersbach & Verena Liessem, 2008.
"Reelection threshold contracts in politics,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 31(2), pages 233-255, August.
- Hans Gersbach & Verena Liessem, 2001. "Reelection Threshold Contracts in Politics," CESifo Working Paper Series 622, CESifo.
- Gersbach, Hans & Liessem, Verena, 2005. "Re-election Threshold Contracts in Politics," CEPR Discussion Papers 5175, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Gersbach, Hans, 2007. "Vote-share Contracts and Democracy," CEPR Discussion Papers 6497, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Hans Gersbach & Markus Müller, 2011. "Information Markets, Elections and Contracts," CESifo Working Paper Series 3327, CESifo.
- Markus Müller, 2009. "Vote-Share Contracts and Learning-by-Doing," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 09/114, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
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More about this item
Keywords
elections; threshold contracts; democracy; information markets; triple mechanism;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2007-01-28 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2007-01-28 (Positive Political Economics)
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