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Informing the public about a pandemic

Author

Listed:
  • Francis de Véricourt,

    (ESMT European School of Management and Technology)

  • Huseyin Gurkan,

    (ESMT European School of Management and Technology)

  • Shouqiang Wang,

    (Naveen Jindal School of Management, The University of Texas at Dallas)

Abstract

This paper explores how governments may efficiently inform the public about an epidemic to induce compliance with their confinement measures. Using an information design framework, we find the government has an incentive to either downplay or exaggerate the severity of the epidemic if it heavily prioritizes the economy over population health or vice versa. Importantly, we find that the level of economic inequality in the population has an effect on these distortions. The more unequal the disease's economic impact on the population is, the less the government exaggerates and the more it downplays the severity of the epidemic. When the government weighs the economy and population health sufficiently equally, however, the government should always be fully transparent about the severity of the epidemic.

Suggested Citation

  • Francis de Véricourt, & Huseyin Gurkan, & Shouqiang Wang,, 2020. "Informing the public about a pandemic," ESMT Research Working Papers ESMT-20-03, ESMT European School of Management and Technology, revised 11 Feb 2021.
    • Handle: RePEc:esm:wpaper:esmt-20-03_r2
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    RePEc Biblio mentions

    As found on the RePEc Biblio, the curated bibliography for Economics:
    1. > Economics of Welfare > Health Economics > Economics of Pandemics > Specific pandemics > Covid-19 > Behavioral issues > Information
    2. > Economics of Welfare > Health Economics > Economics of Pandemics > Specific pandemics > Covid-19 > Behavioral issues > Information

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    Cited by:

    1. Adam Rose, 2022. "Behavioral Economic Consequences of Disasters: A Basis for Inclusion in Benefit–Cost Analysis," Economics of Disasters and Climate Change, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 213-233, July.
    2. Elias Carroni & Giuseppe Pignataro & Luigi Siciliani, 2023. "Persuasion in Physician Agency," Discussion Papers 23/01, Department of Economics, University of York.
    3. Gutierrez, Emilio & Rubli, Adrian & Tavares, Tiago, 2022. "Information and behavioral responses during a pandemic: Evidence from delays in Covid-19 death reports," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 154(C).
    4. Liang Guo & Wendy Xu, 2023. "“We Are the World”: When More Equality Improves Efficiency and Antipandemic Consumptions Are Intervened," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 42(2), pages 214-232, March.
    5. Shraddha Pathak & Ankur A. Kulkarni, 2022. "A Scalable Bayesian Persuasion Framework for Epidemic Containment on Heterogeneous Networks," Papers 2207.11578, arXiv.org.
    6. Huberts, Nick F.D. & Thijssen, Jacco J.J., 2023. "Optimal timing of non-pharmaceutical interventions during an epidemic," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 305(3), pages 1366-1389.

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