When to Coalesce: Early versus Late Coalition Announcement in an Experimental Democracy
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- Goodin, Robert E. & Güth, Werner & Sausgruber, Rupert, 2008. "When to Coalesce: Early Versus Late Coalition Announcement in an Experimental Democracy," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 38(1), pages 181-191, January.
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Cited by:
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"Strategic Voting in Multiparty Systems: A Group Experiment,"
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08-10, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
- Meffert, Michael F. & Gschwend, Thomas, 2008. "Strategic Voting in Multiparty Systems : A Group Experiment," Papers 08-10, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
- Francesco Giovannoni & Daniel Seidmann, 2014.
"Corruption and power in democracies,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(3), pages 707-734, March.
- Francesco Giovannoni & Daniel J. Seidmann, 2008. "Corruption and Power in Democracies," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 08/192, The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol, UK.
- Francesco Giovannoni, 2012. "Corruption and Power in Democracies," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 12/624, School of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
- André Blais & Simon Labbé-St-Vincent & Jean-François Laslier & Nicolas Sauger & Karine van Der Straeten, 2008. "Vote choice in one round and two round elections," Working Papers hal-00335060, HAL.
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NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2005-04-16 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-EXP-2005-04-16 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-POL-2005-04-16 (Positive Political Economics)
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