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Party Coalitions in Multiparty Parliaments: A Game-Theoretic Analysis

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  • Dodd, Lawrence C.

Abstract

This study focuses on A. Lawrence Lowell's classic thesis that a parliamentary democracy must possess a majority party system if durable cabinets are to exist. The argument of this study is that majority party government is not essential to cabinet durability. Rather, in line with the British analyst W. L. Middleton as well as more contemporary game-theoreticians, the critical factor is held to be the coalitional status of the cabinet: (1) cabinets of minimum winning status should be durable; as cabinets depart from minimum winning status, cabinet durability decreases; (2) the coalitional status of the cabinet that forms is partially a product of party system fractionalization, instability, and polarization. Hypotheses derived from the theory are tested with data drawn from 17 Western parliamentary democracies, from 1918 to 1940 and from 1945 to 1970. The findings generally support the theory. A key to durable government is the minimum winning status of the cabinet. Minimum winning cabinets are possible in multiparty and majority party systems.

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  • Dodd, Lawrence C., 1974. "Party Coalitions in Multiparty Parliaments: A Game-Theoretic Analysis," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 68(3), pages 1093-1117, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:68:y:1974:i:03:p:1093-1117_10
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    Cited by:

    1. Michel Le Breton & Karine Van der Straeten, 2013. "Alliances électorales entre deux tours de scrutin. Le point de vue de la théorie des jeux coopératifs et une application aux élections régionales de mars 2010," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 64(2), pages 173-240.
    2. Goodin, Robert E. & Güth, Werner & Sausgruber, Rupert, 2008. "When to Coalesce: Early Versus Late Coalition Announcement in an Experimental Democracy," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 38(1), pages 181-191, January.
    3. Michel Le Breton & Karine Van Der Straeten, 2017. "Alliances Électorales et Gouvernementales : La Contribution de la Théorie des Jeux Coopératifs à la Science Politique," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 127(4), pages 637-736.
    4. Norman Schofield, 1995. "Coalition Politics," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 7(3), pages 245-281, July.

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