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Modeling the electoral dynamics of party polarization in two-party legislatures

Author

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  • Samuel Merrill III

    (Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, Wilkes University, Wilkes-Barre, PA, USA)

  • Bernard Grofman

    (Department of Political Science, and Center for the Study of Democracy, University of California, Irvine, CA, USA)

  • Thomas L Brunell

    (School of Economic, Political and Policy Sciences, University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, TX, USA)

Abstract

While there are many formal models that generate predictions about polarization, only a handful address the question of how, with no change in electoral rules, levels of polarization can dramatically vary over time, as they have in the US House during 150 years of two-party competition. We propose a model that emphasizes national party constraints on district candidates’ ability to locate at positions far from the national party stance. The model predicts a close relation between tight tethers maintained by the national parties and congressional polarization, suggests implications for political competition, and generates the empirically accurate prediction that partisan polarization and within-party differentiation are negatively correlated. When the tethers of the two parties are not equally strong, the model suggests modifications to the conditional party governance approach and helps explain ideological shift/drift affecting both parties, with the party with the tighter tether moving the other party toward its ideological wake.

Suggested Citation

  • Samuel Merrill III & Bernard Grofman & Thomas L Brunell, 2014. "Modeling the electoral dynamics of party polarization in two-party legislatures," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 26(4), pages 548-572, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:26:y:2014:i:4:p:548-572
    DOI: 10.1177/0951629813508847
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. T. D. P. Waters, 2017. "Cracking the whip: spatial voting with party discipline and voter polarization," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 173(1), pages 61-89, October.

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