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Strategic Voting in Multiparty Systems : A Group Experiment

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  • Meffert, Michael F.
  • Gschwend, Thomas

Abstract

The paper tests the theory of strategic voting for multiparty systems with proportional representation and coalition governments at the micro-level. The study focuses in particular on the question whether participation in repeated elections allows voters to learn from experience and enables them to optimize their decision behavior. An economic group experiment with decision scenarios of varying degrees of difficulty was used to test decision making at both the individual and group level. The results suggest that a majority of voters were able to pursue successful decision strategies and that the difficulty of the decision scenarios affected the voting performance of the participants as expected. However, a learning effect is not supported by the data.

Suggested Citation

  • Meffert, Michael F. & Gschwend, Thomas, 2008. "Strategic Voting in Multiparty Systems : A Group Experiment," Papers 08-10, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
    • Handle: RePEc:mnh:spaper:2025
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    1. Gschwend, Thomas, 2004. "Ticket-Splitting and Strategic Voting," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 05-06, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
    2. Alvarez, R. Michael & Nagler, Jonathan, 2000. "A New Approach for Modelling Strategic Voting in Multiparty Elections," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 30(1), pages 57-75, January.
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    5. Fisher, Stephen D., 2004. "Definition and Measurement of Tactical Voting: The Role of Rational Choice," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 34(01), pages 152-166, January.
    6. Lewis-Beck, Michael S. & Skalaban, Andrew, 1989. "Citizen Forecasting: Can Voters See into the Future?," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 19(1), pages 146-153, January.
    7. Meffert, Michael F. & Gschwend, Thomas, 2007. "Strategic Voting under Proportional Representation and Coalition Governments: A Simulation and Laboratory Experiment," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 07-55, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
    8. Niemi, Richard G. & Written, Guy & Franklin, Mark N., 1992. "Constituency Characteristics, Individual Characteristics and Tactical Voting in the 1987 British General Election," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 22(2), pages 229-240, April.
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