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Individual or team decision-making - Causes and consequences of self-selection

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  • Martin Kocher
  • Sabine Strauß
  • Matthias Sutter

Abstract

Even though decision-making in small teams is pervasive in business and in private life, little is known about subjects' preferences with respect to individual and team decision-making and about the consequences of respecting these preferences. We report the results from an experimental beauty-contest game, where subjects could endogenously choose their preferred way of decision-making. About 60% of subjects prefer to act in a team, and teams win the game significantly more often than individuals. Nevertheless, both individuals and team members are highly satisfied with their chosen role, but for different reasons.Even though decision-making in small teams is pervasive in business and in private life, little is known about subjects' preferences with respect to individual and team decision-making and about the consequences of respecting these preferences. We report the results from an experimental beauty-contest game, where subjects could endogenously choose their preferred way of decision-making. About 60% of subjects prefer to act in a team, and teams win the game significantly more often than individuals. Nevertheless, both individuals and team members are highly satisfied with their chosen role, but for different reasons.

Suggested Citation

  • Martin Kocher & Sabine Strauß & Matthias Sutter, 2004. "Individual or team decision-making - Causes and consequences of self-selection," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2004-31, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
    • Handle: RePEc:esi:discus:2004-31
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    beauty-contest game; team decision-making; individual decision-making; endogenous choice; experiment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • J21 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Force and Employment, Size, and Structure
    • M54 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Management

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