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Analytic radicalism

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  • Brad Taylor

Abstract

Brennan and Hamlin provide a normative justification for dispositional conservatism based on the concave value functions which give rise to quasi-risk aversion. This note modifies this argument for “analytic conservatism” by allowing jurisdictional exit in response to institutional decline. By providing a welfare floor which limits the cost of failure, exit reverses the normative implications of Brennan and Hamlin’s argument, making risk-neutral agents quasi-risk seeking and justifying a radical disposition to reform under some circumstances. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Brad Taylor, 2013. "Analytic radicalism," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 166-172, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:24:y:2013:i:2:p:166-172
    DOI: 10.1007/s10602-013-9134-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Brennan, Geoffrey & Hamlin, Alan, 2004. "Analytic Conservatism," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 34(4), pages 675-691, October.
    2. Brennan, Geoffrey & Buchanan, James, 1983. "Predictive Power and the Choice among Regimes," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 93(369), pages 89-105, March.
    3. Kuran, Timur, 1988. "The tenacious past: Theories of personal and collective conservatism," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 143-171, September.
    4. Ng Yew Kwang, 1965. "Why do People Buy Lottery Tickets? Choices Involving Risk and the Indivisibility of Expenditure," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73(5), pages 530-530.
    5. Milton Friedman & L. J. Savage, 1948. "The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 279-279.
    6. Viktor Vanberg & Wolfgang Kerber, 1994. "Institutional competition among jurisdictions: An evolutionary approach," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 193-219, March.
    7. Brennan, Geoffrey & Buchanan, James, 1981. "The normative purpose of economic "science": Rediscovery of an eighteenth century method," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 155-166, December.
    8. Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64(5), pages 416-416.
    9. Giuseppe Eusepi & Alan P. Hamlin (ed.), 2006. "Beyond Conventional Economics," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 4059.
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    Cited by:

    1. Michael Brooks, 2015. "Analytic conservatism and analytic radicalism: Of understated distinctions and other analytical things," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 26(4), pages 442-454, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Conservatism; Radicalism; Tiebout competition; Exit; Risk preference; Constitutional political economy; D61; D81; H10;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General

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