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Child adoption matching: preferences for gender and race

Author

Listed:
  • Baccara, Mariagiovanna
  • Collard-Wexler, Allan
  • Felli, Leonardo
  • Yariv, Leeat

Abstract

This paper uses a new dataset on child-adoption matching to estimate the preferences of potential adoptive parents over US-born and unborn children relinquished for adoption. We identify significant preferences favoring girls and against African American children put up for adoption. These attitudes vary in magnitudes across different adoptive parents—heterosexual, same-sex couples, and single women. We consider the effects of excluding single women and same-sex couples from the process, and find that this would substantially reduce the overall number of adopted children.

Suggested Citation

  • Baccara, Mariagiovanna & Collard-Wexler, Allan & Felli, Leonardo & Yariv, Leeat, 2014. "Child adoption matching: preferences for gender and race," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 46795, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:46795
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    File URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/46795/
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alvin E. Roth, 2009. "What Have We Learned from Market Design?," Innovation Policy and the Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 9(1), pages 79-112.
    2. Anders Björklund & Mikael Lindahl & Erik Plug, 2006. "The Origins of Intergenerational Associations: Lessons from Swedish Adoption Data," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 121(3), pages 999-1028.
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    4. Daniela Del Boca & Christopher J. Flinn, 2005. "Household Time Allocation and Models of Behavior: A Theory of Sorts," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 8, Collegio Carlo Alberto, revised 2006.
    5. Ken Burdett & Melvyn G. Coles, 1997. "Marriage and Class," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(1), pages 141-168.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bethmann, Dirk & Kvasnicka, Michael, 2022. "A Theory of Child Adoption," Journal of Economic Development, The Economic Research Institute, Chung-Ang University, vol. 47(2), pages 101-114, June.
    2. Simon Clark, 2020. ""You're Just My Type!" Matching and Payoffs When Like Attracts Like," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 295, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
    3. Daniela V. Negraia & Jill E. Yavorsky & Denys Dukhovnov, 2019. "Mothers' and fathers' well-being while parenting: does the gender composition of children matter?," MPIDR Working Papers WP-2019-013, Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research, Rostock, Germany.
    4. Morten Størling Hedegaard & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2018. "The Price of Prejudice," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 10(1), pages 40-63, January.
    5. Chiappori, Pierre-André & Oreffice, Sonia & Quintana-Domeque, Climent, 2016. "Black–White Marital Matching: Race, Anthropometrics, And Socioeconomics," Journal of Demographic Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 82(4), pages 399-421, December.
    6. Juan Pantano & Qi Li, 2013. "The Demographic Consequences of Gender Selection Technology," 2013 Meeting Papers 1161, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    7. Vincent W. Slaugh & Mustafa Akan & Onur Kesten & M. Utku Ünver, 2016. "The Pennsylvania Adoption Exchange Improves Its Matching Process," Interfaces, INFORMS, vol. 46(2), pages 133-153, April.
    8. Jiaming Soh & Kegon T. K. Tan, 2020. "The Nurture Effects of Multidimensional Parental Skills on College Attainment," Journal of Human Capital, University of Chicago Press, vol. 14(1), pages 1-42.
    9. Stone, Blayne D., 2024. "On your mark, get set, go: The athletic recruitment and postsecondary experiences of Black male college athletes formerly in foster care," Children and Youth Services Review, Elsevier, vol. 161(C).
    10. Khun, Channary & Lahiri, Sajal, 2017. "The economics of international child adoption: An analysis of adoptions by U.S. parents," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 22-31.
    11. repec:zbw:rwirep:0342 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Cameron Taylor, 2024. "Why do families foster children? A Beckerian approach," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 261-293, March.
    13. Terence Highsmith, 2024. "Dynamic Envy-Free Permanency in Child Welfare Systems," Papers 2411.09817, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2024.
    14. Baccara, Mariagiovanna & Lee, SangMok & Yariv, Leeat, 2020. "Optimal dynamic matching," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(3), July.
    15. Johannes Baumler & Martin Bullinger & Stefan Kober & Donghao Zhu, 2022. "Superiority of Instantaneous Decisions in Thin Dynamic Matching Markets," Papers 2206.10287, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2023.
    16. Dirk Bethmann & Michael Kvasnicka, 2012. "A Theory of Child Adoption," Ruhr Economic Papers 0342, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
    17. Channary Khun & Sajal Lahiri & Sokchea Lim, 2020. "Why Do U.S. Parents Prefer Private To Foster Care Adoptions? The Role Of Adoption Subsidies, Gender, Race, And Special Needs," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 58(4), pages 1757-1782, October.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • J13 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
    • J15 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Minorities, Races, Indigenous Peoples, and Immigrants; Non-labor Discrimination
    • J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination

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